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PARADISE KEPT: A RULE-BASED




In the beginning, the Check-the-Box Regulations created Disre-
garded Entities.1 And the Entities were without form, and empty.
And the Regulations said, let the light of the Code shine through the
Entities; and it did, and the law was clear, and it was good, and tax-
payers were happy.2 And the Regulations blessed the Entities, and
they were fruitful, and they multiplied.
LIKE the story of Genesis, the story of disregarded entities begins
simply and elegantly. Disregarded entities, single member limited
liability companies whose separate legal existence is ignored for all
purposes under the Internal Revenue Code, were created by the Check-
the-Box regulations. 3 Their creation was a logical consequence of the ap-
* Professor of Law, Temple University Beasely School of Law, (Visiting Professor of
Law, Harvard Law School Spring '06). I am honored to have been invited to participate in
this Symposium celebrating the work of Charles 0. Galvin, a scholar whose work I've
admired. Some of Professor Galvin's most widely circulated work cites administrability
gains in supporting changes to existing law. Charles 0. Galvin, To Bury the Estate Tax, Not
to Praise It, 52 TAX NoTEs 1413 (1991); Charles 0. Galvin, Burying the Estate Tax: Keeping
Ghouls Out of the Cemetery: A Reply to Professor Smith, 56 TAX NoTEs 951 (1991);
Charles 0. Galvin, Estate Tax Foe Offers Simple Suggestion, 76 TAX NoTEs 555 (1997).
This piece is the beginning of what I hope will be a fuller study of administrability as an
independent value in tax policy. I thank Professor Galvin for having the foresight to con-
sider the value of administrability even before the Code became the increasingly
unadministrable monster that it is today. I also want to thank Jack Cummings, Rick
Greenstein, Marty McMahon, and Andrea Monroe for insightful and prompt comments on
a prior draft, although they do not necessarily agree with my conclusions and are not re-
sponsible for any errors, omissions, or misguided analysis. Meagan Horn (Harvard, '06),
Dawn Moehn (Temple '06), and Nordia Morris (Harvard '07) provided valuable research
assistance. A summer grant from Temple Law School provided financial support for the
project. Special thanks to Chris Hanna for inviting me to participate and for his unending
grace and patience.
1. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to .7701-3 (as amended in 1999). These regulations were
proposed in May 1996, adopted in December 1996, became effective in January 1997, and
were amended in November 1999.
2. The forgoing was adapted liberally from the First book of Moses. Genesis 1:1
(King James).
3. The Code itself provides for other disregarded entities, for example, a qualified
real estate investment trust ("REIT") subsidiary under § 856(i) and a qualified Subchapter
S subsidiary under §1361(b)(3)("Q-Sub"). I.R.C. §§ 856(i), 1361(b)(3) (West 2006). Those
disregarded entities differ from Check-the-Box disregarded entities because they are statu-
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proach the Treasury adopted in those regulations. 4 Like the God de-
scribed in Genesis, who gave humans dominion over other creatures, the
Treasury, through the Check-the-Box regulations gave taxpayers domin-
ion over the tax treatment of limited liability companies. Taxpayers could
enjoy the benefits of entity status for substantive law purposes, but could
choose a different characterization for federal tax purposes. Taxpayers
could even choose to disregard the existence of the entity completely for
tax purposes, so that the tax law would apply as if the entity did not exist.
For taxpayers, this was the Garden of Eden.
In Genesis, the Garden of Eden is paradise for only two chapters. By
the third chapter the serpent has made its appearance, the apple has been
bitten, and paradise is lost. In the world created by the Check-the-Box
regulations, the serpent has made its appearance and the apple has been
nibbled at, but paradise is not yet lost. This article urges the Internal
Revenue Service ("Service") to stop nibbling, so that paradise is not only
regained but retained.
That the serpent of substance would invade the formalistic world of the
Check-the-Box regulations was perhaps inevitable. Although the Trea-
sury and the Service tried to end uncertainty over entity classification
with the promulgation of the Check-the-Box regulations, the Service
soon discovered that although the regulations put an end to some ques-
tions, they opened the door to others. The Service began issuing private
letter rulings ("PLRs") on disregarded entities in late in 19975 and by
torily created and must also satisfy specific statutory requirements to be disregarded, which
ensure that they are treated as part of the parent entity and limit their versatility. For
example, although both a qualified REIT subsidiary and a Q-Sub must be 100% owned by
a REIT or a subchapter S corporation, respectively, any taxpayer can own a Check-the-
Box disregarded entity. There may also be state tax differences. For additional informa-
tion regarding the differences between the Check-the-Box disregarded entities and other
disregarded entities in the Code, see David S. Miller, The Strange Materialization of the
Tax Nothing, 87 TAX NoTEs 685 (2000).
4. The Check-the-Box regulations established a system under which all domestic un-
incorporated entities would be treated as partnerships unless they elected otherwise. Part-
nerships are pass-through entities, and since single-members LLCs could not be treated as
partnerships, by devising the disregarded entity, the Treasury and the Service came up with
the next best thing: pass-through taxation to the single LLC owner. Part II describes the
development of the Check-the-Box regulations and the disregarded entity in detail. For-
eign entities are also subject to the Check-the-Box regulations, but the regulations operate
differently in the international context. I will restrict my analysis to the domestic treatment
of disregarded entities in this paper, both because that suffices to illustrate my point and
because the international application of the concept implicates different policy
considerations.
5. The earliest ruling that mentions disregarded entities is I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-32-
030 (May 15, 1997). There, the question was whether, after a parent corporation that
wholly owned the stock of several subsidiaries-two of which were the sole partners in a
partnership-made an S election for itself and elected to treat the subsidiaries as Qualified
Subchapter S Subsidiaries, which are disregarded entities, the partnership would be treated
as having a single owner and would cease to be a partnership. The Service concluded that
the partnership became a disregarded entity. In 1998, the Service issued a PLR to a for-
eign entity allowing it to have an extension of time to file. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-46-018
(Nov. 13, 1998). The Service, however, does not seem to have issued rulings in matters
other than extensions until 1999, when it issued the bankruptcy remote rulings discussed
infra note 124 and accompanying text. The nearly two-year lag between adoption of the
[Vol. 59
Paradise Kept
December 2005 had issued nearly 1,000 such rulings.6 Although many of
these rulings involved ministerial matters such as requests for extensions
of time in which to file elections, others involved foundational issues such
as whether an LLC with two legal owners should be treated as a disre-
garded entity because of limitations on the rights of one of the owners.7
Still others involved situations where truly disregarding the separate exis-
tence of the single-member LLC would lead to a substantively incorrect
result.8 Despite the apparent clarity of the rule set forth in the Check-
the-Box regulations, the Service sometimes found the lure of substantive
accuracy too strong to resist. It began to issue PLRs that looked to sub-
stance to determine whether an LLC would be treated as having a single
member and otherwise retreated from the mandate of the regulations to
disregard the separate existence of such entities. 9
The Service's inability to resist the lure of substance is understandable.
At least since Mrs. Gregory lost her case before the Supreme Court in
1935, the primacy of substance has been a bedrock tenet of tax adjudica-
tion.1° Nevertheless, by looking to substance, the Service has departed
from the rule-based approach that produced the Check-the-Box regula-
tions.'1 To look to substance is to apply a standard: substantively similar
transactions ought to be taxed similarly. While that is often an unassaila-
ble goal, in this case, its costs are too great.
When deciding whether to disregard an entity for the purpose of deter-
mining the tax consequences of business transactions, the Service should
abandon the goal of substantive accuracy. Substantive accuracy is
unachievable in a system of elective classification. Elective classification
necessarily produces a system in which substantively identical organiza-
tions are treated differently for tax purposes. The Treasury and the Ser-
vice necessarily abandoned all attempts at classifying unincorporated
entities by reference to substance when they promulgated the Check-the-
Box regulations letting taxpayers choose the classification of unincorpo-
rated entities. The Service should resist the temptation to reintroduce
substantive analysis. Instead, the Service should now focus on achieving
the primary objective of the regulations: administrability. Adminis-
Check-the-Box regulations and the issuance of a number of non-extension PLRs is proba-
bly attributable to the time it took for tax planners (other than the advisors to the taxpay-
ers in I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-32-030) to begin using such entities, thereby discovering
unanswered questions on which guidance was necessary.
6. A LEXIS-NEXIS search conducted in February 2006 turned up 971 PLRs and
technical advice memoranda that contained the words "disregarded entity" or "entity that
is disregarded."
7. See infra note 123 and generally Part B.
8. See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
9. See infra Part II.A.1.
10. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
11. Government officials acknowledge that they have found it difficult to reconcile the
Check-the-Box regulations with the substantive application of the tax law and that their
application of those regulations has been inconsistent. See Kenneth A. Gary, Treasury,
IRS Seek Comments on Disregarded Entity Treatment, TAX NoTEs TODAY, Oct. 14, 2004,
LEXIS, 2004 TNT 199-1.
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trability is the god that the Treasury and the Service purport to have been
worshiping by issuing the Check-the-Box regulations, and adminis-
trability should therefore drive the application of those regulations.
Instead of the ad hoc, sometimes-rule, sometimes-standard approach
the Service is currently taking, or an always-rule, or always-standard, ap-
proach that has the beauty of consistency, this article proposes a bifur-
cated analysis. The proposed analysis distinguishes between situations in
which the characterization of an entity is important ex-ante, where know-
ing whether the entity will be disregarded would allow both taxpayers
and the Service to predict accurately the tax consequences of particular
transactions, and situations where the characterization is relevant only
ex-post, where an event that is not susceptible of planning has already
occurred.
The proposed analysis would use a rule to determine the characteriza-
tion of an entity where characterization of the entity will affect the treat-
ment of business transactions in which the entity engages. In such
situations it is desirable to have a rule so that taxpayers, who can elect the
tax characterization of an entity, can predict with certainty the results of
their election. Certainty is the great virtue of rules and certainty breeds
administrability. It was a quest for certainty and administrability that
drove the promulgation of the Check-the-Box regulations allowing tax-
payer choice, so a rule-based approach follows from the raison d'etre of
the regulations. Although consistent application of a rule can produce
substantively inaccurate results in some cases, inaccuracy is least troub-
ling when the classification is not only elective in the first instance, but
where that election can be changed by taxpayer action. Consistent appli-
cation of a rule will allow taxpayers to decide whether to make or change
an election with maximum information.
There are other situations that do not involve the tax treatment of busi-
ness transactions but rather involve either the act of payment of tax or
the breakdown of the relationship between the entity and the govern-
ment. Such a breakdown occurs when the government seeks to assess or
collect payment of a tax liability. When it comes to assessment, collec-
tion, and payment, the reasons for disregarding the separate existence of
the entity-allowing taxpayers to enjoy pass-through treatment of the tax
consequences of transactions-are not present. In those situations, the
objective should be to ensure that the government is able to collect what
is lawfully due it. In matters involving assessment, collection, and pay-
ment, the rule should not apply. A disregarded entity should be treated
as the taxpayer with respect to tax liability attributable to its economic
activity.
In developing the proposed analysis, I have drawn on scholarship that
examines the application of rules and standards in a variety of legal con-
texts. 12 I have chosen to do that not only because many of the insights
12. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION
OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991); Colin S. Diver, The Opti-
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developed in that scholarship apply in tax, but because by doing so I hope
to make that literature more prominent in tax scholarship generally. The
increasing difficulty of administering the tax system suggests that policy-
makers should think more deeply about the tradeoff between equity and
administrability. Disregarded entities can help to explore that tradeoff
because they are the culmination of more than half a century of struggle
with entity classification and represent one resolution of it. In addition,
the pattern of the struggle between equity and administrability in entity
classification follows that evident in other areas of the law. In Crystals
and Mud in Property Law, Carol Rose described a process in which rules
are promulgated in areas where frequent application demands certainty,
but that very frequency creates exceptions and nuanced analysis, which
converts the rule into a standard, and the cycle begins anew.13 The tax
law on entity classification follows this pattern precisely.
The crisp, clear edges of the crystalline rule set forth in the Check-the-
Box regulations have already begun to blur and the rule-to-standard,
crystal-to-mud pattern is in danger of being repeated. In the future the
Service will come under additional pressure to take a bite from the apple
of substance and revert to using a standard, as it copes with questions
such as the application of § 108 to discharges of disregarded entity debt 14
and the application of the Check-the-Box regulations to single-share-
holder corporations that are administratively dissolved, thus becoming
non-corporate entities under state law. 15 If the Service bows to the pres-
sure to look at substance, the Check-the-Box regulations will not only
have failed to achieve their objective of simplification, but the Service
will have exacerbated complexity by introducing a new set of variables.
Paradise will be lost. The Service can prevent that result by adopting the
analysis proposed here.
Parts I and II of this article will track the development of the Check-
the-Box regulations. They will show the evolution of the law on entity
classification from an apparently crystalline rule contained in the statute
to the mud of the standards created by judicial decisions. Those decisions
were followed by regulatory attempts to introduce crystalline rules, only
to have those rules converted to muddy standards, eventually culminating
in the attempt to restore crystalline order through the adoption of the
Check-the-Box regulations.' 6 Part III will then explain how the Service
has deviated from the rule-based approach of the Check-the-Box regula-
tions in issuing guidance on the tax treatment of various transactions in-
mal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L. J. 557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Carol M. Rose,
Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988); For a compendium of the
scholarship on rules and standards, from an economic perspective, see Kaplow, supra.
13. See supra note 2.
14. See infra Part III.E.1.
15. See id.
16. The reference to crystals and mud is drawn from Carol Rose's work. See generally
Rose, supra note 12.
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volving disregarded entities. Part IV will discuss why the rule-based
approach of the regulations is apt for purposes of ex ante, but not ex post,
determinations. Finally, Part V will conclude by suggesting how the Ser-
vice and Treasury might reconsider their position on the Check-the-Box
regulations and on the guidance the Service has issued.
I. ENTITY CLASSIFICATION BEFORE THE CHECK-THE-BOX
REGULATIONS
A. THE SUPREME COURT CASES: TAXING LIKES ALIKE
Entity classification under the Internal Revenue Code ("Code") 17 has
a long and tortured history. The Code provides that "the term 'corpora-
tion' includes associations, joint-stock companies, and insurance compa-
nies."'18 It is the word "association" that caused the uncertainties that
ultimately led to the promulgation of the Check-the-Box regulations. By
providing that "associations" could be corporations for tax purposes,
Congress suggested that an unincorporated entity could be treated as a
corporation under the Code. 19 The obvious question that followed was
which unincorporated associations should be treated as corporations for
tax purposes?
Before the issuance of the Check-the-Box regulations, the determina-
tion of whether an entity was an association taxable as a corporation de-
pended on the application of six separate factors that required a detailed
examination of the powers, composition, and governance structure of the
entity.20 These factors were derived from Supreme Court case law that
interpreted the meaning of the word "corporation" in the Code. The
17. All references to the "Code" are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended through December, 2005.
18. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) (2005).
19. The Congressional intention to treat all non-partnership business entities alike,
regardless of their formal status as corporations, dates back to 1894, when the statutory
language was even more explicit. Section 32 of the Revenue Act of 1894, which was found
to impose an unconstitutional direct tax in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S.
429 (1895), also imposed a tax on the "net profits or income" of "corporations, companies,
or associations doing business for profit in the United States, no matter how created and
organized, but not including partnerships." Id. at 676 n.2. Income tax legislation before
that time had not imposed a tax on entities by broad type but had instead taxed specific
industries or trades. See Patrick E. Hobbs, Entity Classification: The One Hundred-Year
Debate, 44 CAT. U. L. REv. 437, 438 n.5 (1995).
20. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1), (2) (1960); T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 409. These regu-
lations, generally known as the "Kintner Regulations" because their issuance followed the
government's defeat in United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954), provide that
the six characteristics are as follows: (1) associates; () an objective to carry on business
and to distribute the resulting profits; (3) continuity of life; (4) Kintner centralized manage-
ment; (5) limited liability; and (6) free transferability of interests. The Kintner regulations
provided that those characteristics common to both the entity in question and corporations(like associates and the intent to carry on business for profit in the case of a partnership)
were to be ignored and that classification depended on whether the entity had more than
half of the remaining corporate characteristics. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2) (1960); T.D.
6503, 1060-2 C.B. 409. In the case of partnerships, that meant that if the partnership had
three of the remaining four characteristics, it would be classified as an association and
taxable as a corporation. Id.
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analysis was designed to classify as associations, taxable as corporations,
those entities that resembled corporations. 21 Such an analysis rested on a
standard-the corporation-and sought to treat as corporations only
those entities that resembled corporations.
The Supreme Court began to explore the question of which associa-
tions would be taxable as corporations in 1911,22 a scant two years after
the adoption of the first constitutional corporate income tax23 and two
years before the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment and enactment
of the first constitutional federal income tax. Section 38 of the Corpora-
tion Tax Law of 1909 imposed a tax on "every corporation, joint stock
company or association, organized for profit and having a capital stock
represented by shares .... -24 Having decided that the Corporation Tax
Law was constitutional in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 25 the Court in Eliot v.
Freeman had to decide whether real estate trusts would be subject to the
corporate income tax.26 The analysis the Court adopted in Freeman to
determine which unincorporated entities would be subject to the corpo-
rate income tax was founded on the analysis the Court had just developed
in Stone Tracy to conclude that the tax itself was constitutional. It re-
flected the standard-based approach that began with Stone Tracy and that
would dominate entity classification for the next eighty-five years.
Freeman27 and Stone Tracy28 were decided on the same day in unani-
mous opinions written by the same Justice,29 so it is not surprising that
the Court used the same type of analysis in both decisions. 30 To decide
whether the corporate income tax was constitutional in Stone Tracy, the
Court had to determine whether the tax was a direct tax, which must be
21. The test was known as the "resemblance test." For a detailed description of the
test and an explanation of its historical development and application, see generally Hobbs,
supra note 19.
22. See Eliot v. Freeman, 220 U.S. 178, 185-86 (1911).
23. Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of Aug. 5, 1909, Pub. L. No. 61-5, ch. 6, 36 Stat. 11 (1909).
The word "association" made its first appearance in the Revenue Act of 1894. Hobbs,
supra note 19, at 439.
24. Id. § 38, 36 Stat. at 112.
25. 220 U.S. 107 (1911). In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469
U.S. 528 (1985), the Court overruled National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976), a case in which the Court had applied a Commerce Clause analysis like the one it
applied in Stone Tracy to uphold the Corporation Tax Law against a commerce clause
challenge. Although Shepard's lists Stone Tracy as being overruled by Garcia, I believe
that conclusion goes too far. In Garcia, the Court only overruled a case that had employed
a test similar to that employed in Stone Tracy. The Court did not overrule Stone Tracy
directly. Nothing in Garcia suggests that the Court would hold the corporate income tax to
be unconstitutional, a conclusion that is implied by listing Stone Tracy as overruled. I have
therefore declined to describe Stone Tracy as overruled.
26. 220 U.S. at 184.
27. 220 U.S. 178.
28. 220 U.S. 107.
29. Both opinions were written by Mr. Justice Day, and both opinions were
unanimous.
30. Freeman was argued on January 19, 1911 and decided on March 13, 1911. Free-
man, 220 U.S. at 178. Stone Tracy was first argued on March 17 and 18, 1910, was rear-
gued on January 17, 18, and 19, 1911, and was also decided on March 13, 1911. Stone
Tracy, 220 U.S. at 107.
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apportioned, or an indirect excise that was constitutionally permissible
even if not apportioned. 31 Although much about the Court's decision in
Stone Tracy has been roundly criticized, 32 my purpose here is not to pass
judgment on the Court's analysis but rather to examine its analytical ap-
proach. In Stone Tracy, the Court found that the tax was an excise on
doing business in corporate form and was therefore not a direct tax.33
Crucial to its finding that the tax was an excise tax was the Court's con-
clusion that the subject of the tax was the doing of business in a particular
form and the levy was therefore a tax imposed on the privilege of doing
business in that form.34 That form was the corporation, but that conclu-
sion did not end the inquiry. The Court also had to show that the tax did
not violate the Uniformity Clause.35
The Court concluded that the tax did not violate the Uniformity
Clause, because the tax applied only to businesses conducted in a particu-
lar form; that form gave those businesses advantages and attributes that
were not available to businesses conducted in other forms and therefore
made those other businesses distinguishable. As the Court explained:
The thing taxed is not the mere dealing in merchandise in which the
actual transactions may be the same, whether conducted by individu-
als or corporations, but the tax is laid upon the privileges which exist
in conducting business with the advantages which inhere in the cor-
porate capacity of those taxed, and which are not enjoyed by private
firms or individuals. These advantages are obvious, and have led to
31. Apportionment is required by Article I of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I,
§§ 2, cl. 3, 9, cl. 4.
32. See infra note 33.
33. This conclusion has been soundly and frequently criticized, and the case referred
to as "infamous." See, e.g., Hobbs, supra note 19, at 456. Calvin Johnson has observed
that,
After Pollock and before the Amendment, the Supreme Court had retreated
to a more flexible, functional definition of "direct tax," much like the one
that had prevailed before Pollock, so that only the income tax remained at
issue. The Sixteenth Amendment only governed income taxes, not because it
was meant to preserve some area of non-income taxes in which apportion-
ment was thought to be of continued constitutional value, but because appor-
tionment seemed to have been otherwise sufficiently nullified by judicial
doctrine, except for the income tax.
Calvin H. Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes: The Foul-Up in the Core of the Consti-
tution, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 27 (1998). See also Erik M. Jensen, The Apportion-
ment of "Direct Taxes": Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2334,
2376 n.236 (1997) (quoting JOHN STEELE GORDON, HAMILTON'S BLESSING: THE Ex-
TRAORDINARY LIFE AND TIMES OF OUR NATIONAL DEBT 86, 97 (1997), "One can hardly
help admiring the legal artistry of [Chief Justice] Taft's deft end run around an inconve-
nient phrase in the Constitution.").
34. Stone Tracy, 220 U.S. at 150. Hobbs explains that President Taft explicitly pro-
posed an income tax to "protect the integrity of the Court" by allowing them to uphold the
constitutionality of that tax without having to overrule Pollock and to "spare the Court
from having to reconsider the income tax issue until after Congress and the states contem-
plated a Constitutional amendment." Hobbs, supra note 19, at 454-55 (footnotes omitted).
35. The Uniformity Clause provides that "The Congress shall have Power To lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and Provide for the Common
Defense and General Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises
shall be uniform throughout the United States." U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
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the formation of such companies in nearly all branches of trade. The
continuity of the business, without interruption by death or dissolu-
tion, the transfer of property interests by the disposition of shares of
stock, the advantages of business controlled and managed by corpo-
rate directors, the general absence of individual liability, these and
other things inhere in the advantages of business thus conducted,
which do not exist when the same business is conducted by private
individuals or partnerships. It is this distinctive privilege which is the
subject of taxation, not the mere buying or selling or handling of
goods which may be the same, whether done by corporations or
individuals. 36
As the forgoing passage reveals, in deciding the Uniformity Clause is-
sue, the Court in Stone Tracy used four characteristics of the corporate
form (continuity of life, transferability of interests, centralized manage-
ment, and limited liability) both to identify and to limit the kinds of busi-
nesses that were to be subject to the tax. Not coincidentally, those are the
characteristics on which the bulk of modem analysis has proceeded. Out
of the six characteristics of the corporate form, only those four can distin-
guish between corporations and unincorporated associations that more
closely resemble partnerships than corporations.3 7 In Stone Tracy, the
Court not only established the constitutionality of the corporate income
tax but also provided the foundation for the standard-based analysis that
persisted until the promulgation of the Check-the-Box regulations.
The Court returned to that analysis in Freeman. In that case the ques-
tion was whether trusts would be subject to the corporate income tax,
which by its terms applied to "corporations and joint-stock associations
[that] are now or hereafter organized under the laws of the United
States," 38 and the Court interpreted that language to include only entities
organized under a state statute. As the Court explained,
It was the purpose of the act to treat corporations and joint stock
companies, similarly organized, in the same way, and assess them
upon the facility in doing business which is substantially the same in
both forms of organization. Joint stock organizations are not infre-
quently organized under the statute laws of a State, deriving there-
from, in large measure, the characteristics of a corporation. 39
The Court concluded that since the trusts in question were not organized
under a state statute, they did not derive any benefit from the statutory
laws of the state and were therefore not subject to the tax. 40 To under-
score the difference between the entities described in the tax law, which
derived from a statute "some quality or benefit not existing at the com-
36. Stone Tracy, 220 U.S. at 161-62.
37. See supra note 20. The other two hallmarks, associates and an objective to carry
on business for profit were common to both corporations and partnerships and so were not
factored into the analysis. Stone Tracy, 220 U.S. at 161-62. See also supra n.20.
38. Eliot v. Freeman, 220 U.S. 178, 178, 185 (1911).
39. Id. at 185-186.
40. Id. at 187.
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mon law," and the trusts at issue in the case the Court pointed out that
"[t]hese trusts do not have perpetual succession, but end with lives in
being and twenty years thereafter. '41
Subsequent early cases followed a similar approach. In Crocker v. Mal-
ley, 4 2 the Court again had to rule on the application of the corporate in-
come tax imposed by the 1913 Act to a trust.43 That legislation imposed a
tax on "every corporation, joint stock company or association, and every
insurance company, organized in the United States, no matter how cre-
ated or organized, not including partnerships. '44 In concluding that the
trust in question was not subject to the tax, Justice Holmes applied a stan-
dards-based analysis and explained,
[I]f we assume that the words "no matter how created or organized"
apply to "association" and not only to "insurance company," still it
would be a wide departure from normal usage to call the benefi-
ciaries here a joint-stock association when they are admitted not to
be partners in any sense, and when they have no joint action or inter-
est and no control over the fund. 45
Four years later, in Hecht v. Malley,46 the Court had to make a similar
decision under the Revenue Act of 191647 and the Revenue Act of
1918.48 The Court found that the trusts in question were not subject to
tax under the 1916 Act because they did not derive authority from any
state statutory enactment, but were subject to tax under the 1918 Act.49
The reason for the difference in result was the difference in the language
of the two statutes. Unlike the 1916 and previous Acts, the 1918 Act
imposed a tax on corporations and then defined corporations to include
"associations, joint-stock companies, and insurance companies." 50 The
change in the language from the 1916 and prior Acts to the 1918 Act5'
showed that Congress intended "to extend the tax from one imposed
solely upon organizations exercising statutory privileges, as theretofore,
to include also organizations exercising the privilege of doing business as
associations at the common law."52 Freed from the constraint of the stat-
utory link, the Court turned to the dictionary to uncover the meaning of
41. Id.
42. 249 U.S. 223 (1919).
43. See Revenue Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, § II(G)(a), 38 Stat. 114, 172.
44. Id.
45. Crocker, 249 U.S. at 223.
46. 265 U.S. 144 (1924).
47. Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, 39 Stat. 789.
48. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, 40 Stat. 1057 (1919)
49. Hecht, 265 U.S. at 154-47.
50. Revenue Act of 1918 ch. 18, 40 Stat. at 1058.
51. As described by Professor Hobbs, that change involved the provision of a defini-
tional section in the 1918 Act which changed the placement of a comma, so that the statute
went from applying to "corporations, joint-stock companies or associations, .... " to "the
term 'corporation' includes associations, joint-stock companies,.. ." thus indicating that
the term "association" was not to be limited to entities that resembled joint-stock compa-
nies. See Hobbs, supra note 19, at 439.
52. Hecht, 265 U.S. at 155.
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the term "association" and decide whether the trusts were associations
within the meaning of the 1918 Act. The Court consulted three dictiona-
ries and cited three definitions of the term "association" that shared one
common characteristic: they defined association by reference to corpora-
tions, using the corporation as a standard against which the entity in ques-
tion was to be measured. 53 Although the specifics of the analysis had
changed as a result of the change in the statutory language, the method of
analysis-determining whether the entity to be classified shared the im-
portant characteristics of the referenced entity-had not. The Court con-
cluded that
[W]hen the nature of the three trusts here involved is considered, as
the petitioners are not merely trustees for collecting funds and pay-
ing them over, but are associated together in much the same manner
as the directors in a corporation for the purpose of carrying on busi-
ness enterprises, the trusts are to be deemed associations within the
meaning of the Act of 1918. 54
As before, the Court was using a standard-the corporation-to deter-
mine the coverage of the statute.
Although the statutory formulation has remained essentially un-
changed since 1918, the Court needed to continue to construe the mean-
ing of the term "association." That, of course, is one of the problems with
standards: they require a nuanced analysis that makes it difficult to pre-
dict the outcome of any given case. Nevertheless, the Court continued to
apply a standard-based analysis. In Morrissey v. Commissioner,55 the
Court acknowledged this difficulty and tried to provide a more definitive
formulation.56 It therefore concluded that "[t]he inclusion of associations
with corporations implies resemblance; but it is resemblance and not
identity. The resemblance points to features distinguishing associations
from partnerships as well as from ordinary trusts."'57 The analysis had
53. The three definitions were: (1) "a term 'used throughout the United States to sig-
nify a body of persons united without a charter, but upon the methods and forms used by
incorporated bodies for the prosecution of some common enterprise.'" Id. at 157 (quoting
1 BENJAMIN ABnoIrr DICTIONARY OF TERMS AND PHRASES USED IN AMERICAN OR EN-
GLISH JURISPRUDENCE 101 (1879); 1 JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY 269 (Rawle's 3d
Rev.); 3 AMERICAN & ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA LAW 162" (2d ed.)); (2) "'In the United
States, as distinguished from a corporation, a body of persons organized, for the prosecu-
tion of some purpose, without a charter, but having the general form and mode of proce-
dure of a corporation."' Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY); (3)
"'[U.S.] An organized but unchartered body analogous to but distinguished from a corpo-
ration."' Id. (quoting THE PRACTICAL STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE).
54. Id. at 161.
55. 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
56. The Court observed that "[w]hile it is impossible in the nature of things to trans-
late the statutory concept of 'association' into a particularity of detail that would fix the
status of every sort of enterprise or organization which ingenuity may create, the recurring
disputes emphasize the need of a further examination of the congressional intent." Id. at
356.
57. Id. The Court employed the same analysis in the three companion cases that it
decided at the same time it decided Morrissey. See Swanson v. Comm'r, 296 U.S. 362, 365
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become more refined with each successive case, but the standard-based
approach, with its emphasis on discerning similarities so that likes could
be taxed alike, and equity and theoretical purity thus achieved, became
more entrenched. 58 Regulations adopted after Morrissey generally fol-
lowed the analysis developed in that case, adopting the so-called resem-
blance test and thus enshrining the standard-based approach in the
regulatory framework.
B. THE KINTNER REGULATIONS: RESULT-ORIENTED DRAFTING
LEADS TO INCREASING FORMALISM
Morrissey marked the end of the Supreme Court's involvement with
the definition of the term 'association', but the law on the subject did not
stand still. Although corporate status brought with it the imposition of an
undesirable entity level tax, it also had significant benefits, particularly
with respect to tax-qualified pension plans. 59 Before the advent of the
professional corporation, unincorporated groups of professionals wanted
to be classified as associations (taxable as corporations) for federal in-
come tax purposes so that they could establish pension plans under terms
then available only to corporations. 60 After the government lost in court
under the then-existing regulations (which had adopted the post-Morris-
sey resemblance test) in Kintner v. United States,61 where the court held
that an unincorporated organization with unlimited life and centralized
management would be taxable as a corporation, the Treasury amended
those regulations to make classification as an association more difficult.62
The resulting regulations, which became known as the Kintner regula-
(1935); Helvering v. Combs, 296 U.S. 365, 368 (1935); Helvering v. Coleman-Gilbert As-
socs., 296 U.S. 369, 372 (1935).
58. The Court was not deciding these entity classification cases in a vacuum. The Trea-
sury Department had issued regulations interpreting the various provisions of the different
statutes and the Court had these formulations before it. But since the regulations could
not apply unless they were valid in each case, the Court was not just enforcing a regulatory
provision but was passing on the validity of that regulatory construction. For a detailed
analysis of the regulatory evolution, see Hobbs, supra note 19, at 468-81.
59. See Hobbs, supra note 19, at 482-91.
60. Id.
61. 107 F. Supp. 976 (D. Mont. 1952), affd, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
62. In Kintner, under the regulations then applicable, the district court observed that
"If an organization is not interrupted by the death of a member or by a change in owner-
ship of a participating interest during the agreed period of its existence, and its manage-
ment is centralized in one or more persons in their representative capacities, such an
organization is an association, taxable as a corporation." Id. at 979 (quoting Treas. Reg.
§ 29.3797-4 (1949)). The court concluded that since the organization in question satisfied
those two requirements, it would be treated as a corporation for federal income tax pur-
poses. Under the amended regulations an organization had to have more corporate than
non-corporate characteristics. See Hobbs, supra note 19, at 486 (noting that under the
amended regulations three of four factors must be met); see also Gregg D. Polsky, Can
Treasury Overrule the Supreme Court?, 84 B.U. L. REV. 185, 217 (2004) (noting that three
of four factors must be met). As Professor Victor Fleisher has observed, "the Court [in
Morrissey] never intended a mechanical application of its enumerated factors." Victor E.
Fleischer, If It Looks Like a Duck: Corporate Resemblance and Check-the-Box, 96 COLUM.
L. REV. 518, 525-26 (1996), reprinted in TAX NoTEs TODAY, Apr. 19, 1996, LEXIS, 96 TNT
78-26 at para. 13. In Morrissey itself the Court observed that,
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tions, retained the resemblance test, but modified its application to make
it less likely that unincorporated organizations would be classified as
associations. 63
To make corporate status more difficult to attain, the Kintner regula-
tions replaced the general weighing of factors to determine corporate re-
semblance with a numerical requirement. An organization had to have
three of the four corporate characteristics to be classified as an associa-
tion taxable as a corporation.64 The addition of a quantitative measure
made the test more rule-like 65 and subjected the new regulations to criti-
cism on the ground that they departed from the Supreme Court-sanc-
tioned Morrissey approach. 66 Still, the nominal use of the resemblance
test suggested that the regulations sought to tax as corporations only
those entities that resembled corporations in some meaningful way, and
that only the determination of what was meaningful had changed. To that
extent the Kintner regulations continued to reflect a standard-based ap-
proach, albeit one that was tending toward a rule.67
The term embraces associations as they may exist at common law. We have
already referred to the definitions, quoted in that case, showing the ordinary
meaning of the term as applicable to a body of persons united without a
charter "but upon the methods and forms used by incorporated bodies for
the prosecution of some common enterprise." These definitions, while help-
ful, are not to be pressed so far as to make mere formal procedure a control-
ling test. The provision itself negatives such a construction. Thus
unincorporated joint-stock companies have generally been regarded as bear-
ing the closest resemblance to corporations. But, in the revenue acts, associa-
tions are mentioned separately and are not to be treated as limited to "joint-
stock companies," although belonging to the same group. While the use of
corporate forms may furnish persuasive evidence of the existence of an asso-
ciation, the absence of particular forms, or of the usual terminology of corpo-
rations, cannot be regarded as decisive.
Morrissey, 296 U.S. at 358 (citations omitted).
Polsky has also noted that the Court did not particularly give weight to any of the fac-
tors, "appearing to use an overall facts and circumstances test. Nor did the Court provide
any guidance regarding the degree of corporate similarity necessary in order for an entity
to be considered an association." Polsky, supra at 216.
63. Hobbs, supra note 19, at 486. See Treas. Reg. §301.7701-2(a)(1)-(3) (1960); T.D.
6503, 1960-2 C.B. 409. See also supra note 62.
64. Hobbs, supra note 19, at 486. See also supra note 62.
65. In Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 (1976), the Tax Court noted that "[t]he
regulations discuss each major corporate characteristic separately, and each apparently
bears equal weight in the final balancing. This apparently mechanical approach may per-
haps be explained as an attempt to impart a degree of certainty to a subject otherwise
fraught with imponderables."
66. The Kintner regulations were criticized as being inconsistent with Morrissey inso-
far as they provided a bright line test. See Polksy, supra note 62, at 218.
67. The emphasis on evaluating the existence of corporate characteristics reflected
continued reliance on a standard, but the description of each characteristic was becoming
more detailed and thus more rule-like. For example, as Hobbs noted, the regulations
stated that
"Free transferability of interests" existed under the regulations if members
owning substantially all of the interests in the organization had the power to
transfer their entire interest to a non-member without consent. If, however,
members were only free to transfer their rights to the profits of the enterprise
and not their rights to participate in the management of the enterprise, then
the corporate characteristic of free transferability did not exist.
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Although the advent of the professional corporation and the amend-
ment of the Code to create parity between corporate and noncorporate
pension plans made it unlikely that cases like Kintner would arise again,
neither development put an end to the need to engage in the exercise of
entity classification. Beginning in the late 1960s, partnerships became the
vehicle of choice for structuring ventures designed to pass significant tax
benefits to groups of individuals. Many of these ventures eventually
came to be known as tax shelters. The Service initially attempted to
thwart the tax objectives of these ventures by seeking to have them classi-
fied as corporations for tax purposes. 68 The Service was largely unsuc-
cessful, and the early 1980s saw the development of the Master Limited
Partnership ("MLP"), a publicly traded entity that enjoyed limited liabil-
ity and centralized management but still purported to be a pass-through
entity for tax purposes.69
The development of MLPs revealed the difficulty of maintaining a
standard-based approach while providing certainty in tax administration.
Indeed, the Treasury took a number of inconsistent positions during this
time,70 and in 1987 it succeeded in obtaining legislation (codified in
§ 7704) to tax publicly traded partnerships as corporations, thus ending
the need to have regulations of general applicability do the job.71 The
enactment of § 7704 ended the reign of the Morrissey resemblance test
with respect to publicly traded organizations. Under this provision, pub-
licly traded organizations (with only a very few exceptions) 72 were
See Hobbs, supra note 19, at 488.
68. See Hobbs, supra note 19, at 498-502.
69. Master Limited Partnerships ("MLPs") were limited partnerships whose partner-
ship interests were publicly traded either on an exchange or over the counter. The first
MLP appeared in 1981 and the growth of MLPs was substantial over the next few years. J.
COMM. ON TAXATION, 100TM CONG., TAX TREATMENT OF MASTER LIMITED PARTNER-
SHIPS n.l (Comm. Print 1987), reprinted in Tax Treatment of Master Limited Partnerships:
Joint Committee on Taxation Explains Master Limited Partnerships, 87 TAX NOTES TODAY,
June 30, 1987, LEXIS, 87 TNT 126-3, at n.11. MLPs were popular because they provided
pass-through taxation and only one level of tax. Although the natural resource industries
were the first to take advantage of the MLP structure, soon, a wide variety of entities
requiring capital contributions were utilizing the structure. For example, the Boston Cel-
tics operated as an MLP. See Finance/New Issues; Celtics Basketball Team Goes Public,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1986, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9AO
DE6DC113FF937A35751C1A960948260. The Government soon became concerned about
the potential erosion of the corporate tax base and the practical difficulties of applying
Subchapter K to publicly traded entities that could have a number of partners within the
span of a single day. For a more complete discussion on the proposed tax treatment of
MLPs, see generally Tax Treatment of Master Limited Partnerships: Joint Committee on
Taxation Explains Master Limited Partnerships, supra.
70. Tar Treatment of Master Limited Partnerships: Joint Committee on Taxation Ex-
plains Master Limited Partnerships, supra note 69; see also Hobbs, supra note 19, at 498-
502. Treasury even proposed regulations that would have treated an entity as a corpora-
tion if it all of its members enjoyed limited liability. For further description of the pro-
posed regulations and their fate, as well as some of the inconsistent positions the IRS took
during this time, see infra note 81.
71. Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10211(c), 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-403; see
Hobbs, supra note 19, at 503-511.
72. If ninety percent of a publicly traded partnership's income is "qualifying income"
for the current taxable year and each preceding taxable year the partnership was a publicly
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treated as corporations, whether they resembled corporations in any
other way or not. Section 7704 provided a rule. Use of a standard in that
area became history.
C. THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY: TRENDSETTING ON
THE RANGE
Despite the enactment of § 7704, the passage of the Tax Reform Act of
1986 put additional pressure on the entity classification issue; some of the
changes wrought by that legislation, most notably the repeal of the Gen-
eral Utilities doctrine,73 made many taxpayers want to do business
through an entity that provided the benefits of limited liability but would
be treated for tax purposes as a partnership. 74 This contributed signifi-
traded partnership, then § 7704(a) will not apply (the partnership will not be a per se cor-
poration) unless the partnership could qualify as regulated investment company (with
some qualifications). "Qualifying income" is income from interest, dividends, real property
rents, gain from the sale or other disposition of real property, income and gains derived
from the exploration, development, mining or production, processing, refining, transporta-
tion (including pipelines transporting gas, oil, or products thereof), or the marketing of any
mineral or natural resource (including fertilizer, geothermal energy, and timber), any gain
from the sale or disposition of a capital asset, and in some circumstances, the income and
gains from commodities or futures, forwards, and options with respect to commodities.
73. Gen. Utils. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935). In General Utili-
ties, the Court held that a corporation's distribution of shares of stock of a different corpo-
ration as a dividend to its shareholders would not result in gain at the corporate level. The
Court found that the transaction did not constitute a sale and noted that assets were not
used to discharge indebtedness. Id. at 206. Over time, the case was interpreted to mean
that there would be no corporate level tax on corporate distributions of appreciated prop-
erty and was extended by statute to cover certain liquidating sales of property. See Boyd
C. Randall & Dave N. Stewart, Corporate Distributions: Handling Liabilities in Excess of
the Fair Market Value of Property Remains Unresolved, 19 J. OF CORP. TAX'N 55 (1992).
However, the General Utilities doctrine was repealed by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. After
the repeal, gain was recognized
by a corporation on (1) a liquidating distribution of its property as if the
property had been sold at its fair market value to the distributee; (2) a liqui-
dating sale of its property; and (3) a nonliquidating distribution of its prop-
erty as if the property had been sold at its fair market value to the
distributee.
Id. See I.R.C. §§ 311, 336 (2005).
74. See George R. Goodman, Corporate and Partnership M&A Tax Laws: Is it Time to
Merge Subchapters C and K?, 95 TAx NoTEs 1497, 1497 (2002). See also Richard M. Lip-
ton, Phillip M. Brunson & Stefan F. Tucker, Critical Partnership Tax Issues-An Overview,
1186 PLI/CoRp 343, 377 (June 2000). With the repeal of General Utilities, and the inversion
of tax rates resulting from the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the pass-through status of partner-
ships became markedly more valuable. However, before the existence of LLCs, a partner-
ship could achieve limited liability for its partners only by becoming a Limited Partnership.
The problem was that a limited partner could not be a working partner (for example, a
partner in a law firm) without becoming liable for the liabilities of the partnership. In
cases where limited partners did not want to be involved in management, the technique of
creating a limited partnership with a corporate general partner did not achieve the same
objective as incorporation, because the corporate general partner had to be adequately
capitalized if it was to be respected in that capacity, thus preventing the full insulation of
significant assets from liability for partnership debts. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d) (1995).
The issuance of Rev. Rul. 88-76, which classified a Wyoming LLC as a partnership for
federal tax purposes, resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of LLCs formed. See
Philip F. Postlewaite & John S. Pennell, JCT's Partnership Tax Proposals: 'Houston, We
Have a Problem,' 76 TAX NoTEs 527, 29 (1997) (stating that Rev. Rul. 88-76 "opened the
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cantly to the increase in popularity of the Limited Liability Company
("LLC"), an entity first created by a 1977 Wyoming statute,75 and made it
necessary for the Treasury to reconsider its approach to the entity classifi-
cation question.
Under the Kintner regulations, as then in effect, an entity would be
classified as a corporation if it more closely resembled a corporation than
any other form of business organization, but the regulations also provided
that such resemblance could not exist unless the organization had more
corporate than non-corporate characteristics. 76 If an LLC had limited lia-
bility and centralized management, but lacked continuity of life and free
transferability of interests, it could not be classified as a corporation
under the Kintner regulations. The drafters of the 1977 Wyoming LLC
statute were undoubtedly aware of this, and the statute provided for the
dissolution of an LLC after the expiration of a set period, with the unani-
mous consent of the members, or upon the death, retirement, resignation,
insanity, bankruptcy, or expulsion of a member.77 In addition, the statute
provided that an assignee of an interest in an LLC could not become a
full member without the unanimous consent of the other members, thus
preventing the LLC from enjoying free transferability of interests. 78
The absence of two out of the four relevant corporate characteristics
was sufficient for the Service to conclude that the LLCs created under the
Wyoming statute would not be classified as associations, taxable as corpo-
rations, without detracting from the attractiveness of that form of organi-
zation for closely held businesses. The statute provided for flexibility
with respect to the existence of centralized management, 79 and the areas
where it differed from the corporate form, limited life and restrictions on
transferability, were not significant in most closely held businesses. In
most such businesses, the continuity of the enterprise depends on the in-
volvement of one or more key individuals anyway, and it is not usually in
their self-interest to allow the free transferability of interests that could
bring uncongenial individuals into the organization. Thus, the Wyoming
LLC statute gave most closely held businesses the corporate characteris-
tics they craved-the flexibility to enjoy centralized management and
management by equity holders without relinquishing limitation of liabil-
ity8°-while at the same time providing partnership treatment for federal
floodgates" and increased the use of the LLC "exponentially"). See also, Robert B. Keat-
inge, New Gang in Town, 4 APR Bus. L. TODAY 5 (1995) (noting that by 1994, forty-five
states had enacted LLC statutes).
75. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-122 (1977). Wyoming was the first state to enact an
LLC statute.
76. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -11 (1960); T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 409. See also supra
notes 62-64 and accompanying text for an explanation of the Kintner regulations.
77. § 17-15-107(a).
78. § 17-15-122.
79. See Hobbs, supra note 19, at 487.
80. Under the Uniform Limited Partnership act ("ULPA"), if a limited partner is in-
volved in management he/she relinquishes the benefit of limited liability. Thus, limited
partnerships are not nearly as attractive as LLCs, and LPs also need a general partner with




Recognizing that this result followed from the Kintner regulations, the
Treasury and the Service considered amending those regulations to pre-
vent characterization of LLCs as partnerships. In 1980 the Treasury even
proposed regulations that would have classified an entity as an associa-
tion if its members enjoyed limited liability.81 Perhaps because of its ex-
perience with the Kintner regulations, which had provided partnership
treatment for organizations that the Treasury believed should be taxed as
corporations because of their mechanical application, the Treasury was
hesitant to adopt a rule-based, single-factor test, and it withdrew the pro-
posed amendments roughly two years after announcing them.82 At the
same time, the IRS announced that it would "undertake a study of the
rules for entity classification with a special focus on the significance of the
characteristic of limited liability." 83
Taxpayers' dreams came true in 1988 with the issuance of Rev. Rul. 88-
76 where the Service concluded that the Wyoming limited liability com-
pany would be treated as a partnership. 84 Rather than changing the regu-
lations (as it had after losing Kintner) the government simply applied the
regulations as written and confirmed the result that the drafters of the
Wyoming (and other) LLC statutes had concluded would follow there-
regulations provided that a corporate general partner would not be treated as having full
liability unless it was adequately capitalized). Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d) (1995).
81. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2), 45 Fed. Reg. 75,709 (Nov. 17, 1980), provided
that "an organization will be classified as an association if under local law no member of
the organization is personally liable for debts of the organization." Id. at 75,710. Under
this formulation, only one corporate characteristic was important: the existence of limited
liability. By so circumscribing the analysis, the Treasury was moving from the standard-
based approach of the resemblance test as formulated in Morrissey and the regulations
promulgated thereafter to a rule-based approach where only one thing-easily ascertained
by reference to state law-was determinative. The Treasury eventually withdrew the pro-
posed regulation and explained the withdrawal as being in response to comments received;
the only comment publicly available through Tax Notes is one by Richard Cohen, who
objected to the proposed regulations precisely on the ground that by making only one
factor determinative, the proposed regulation contravened case law. Richard G. Cohen,
New York Attorney Comments that the Proposed Single Factor Test for Limited Liability
Companies Is Inappropriate, 17 TAX NoTEs 757 (1982). On November 18, 1980, the Ser-
vice had issued a PLR concluding that a Wyoming LLC would be taxed as a partnership.
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-06-082 (Nov. 18, 1980). Nearly two years after the release of the
proposed amendment to the regulations, the Service issued another PLR in which it came
to a conclusion consistent with the proposed amendment, but inconsistent with its conclu-
sion in I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul 81-06-082 (Nov. 18, 1980). In I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 83-04-138
(Oct. 29, 1982), the Service concluded that a Wyoming LLC was an association taxable as a
corporation. See Hobbs, supra note 19, at 514-515. Under the Kintner regulations it was
possible to conclude that a limited partnership did not enjoy limited liability even if the
only general partner was a corporation, because the regulations treated a corporate gen-
eral partner as having personal liability for the debts of the partnership if the corporate
general partner was adequately capitalized. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701(d)(2) (1995).
82. I.R.S. Announcement 83-4, 1983-2, I.R.B. 31 (Jan. 10, 1983). In 1983 Treasury also
took the position that MLPs should not be classified as associations on the basis of the
existence of limited liability alone. See Hobbs, supra note 19, at 515, n.514.
83. I.R.S. Announcement 83-4, 1983-2 I.R.B. 31.




What happened next was not surprising: every other state in the union
eventually adopted LLC legislation, preventing Wyoming from becoming
the Delaware of LLCs and allowing all taxpayers to partake of this new
and very useful form of business organization. 86 Together with the earlier
enactment of § 7704 in 1986, this resulted in a system in which all publicly
traded organizations were subject to the corporate income tax as a result
of § 7704, but non-publicly traded organizations were necessarily subject
to the corporate income tax only if they chose to be organized as corpora-
tions. If they wanted limited liability and chose to be organized as LLCs
they could effectively choose whether or not to be taxed as corporations
by choosing how many corporate characteristics to adopt.87 The develop-
ment of the LLC, coupled with the structure of the formalistic, numbers-
based test of the Kintner regulations, resulted in a corporate tax system
that was, at least for newly created entities that were not publicly traded,
essentially elective. Taxpayers that wanted to avoid classification of an
entity as an association taxable as a corporation could do so virtually at
will simply by including certain provisions in the terms of the LLC oper-
ating agreement. Because providing terms that would either allow or
85. Although commentators have speculated on the reasons for the Treasury's change
of heart, it is impossible to know for certain what factors combined to produce that result.
Some have speculated that the Treasury wanted Congress to act and perhaps thought that,
given the Congressional foray into classification questions with the enactment of I.R.C.
§ 7704, Congress might be willing to do so again. See Hobbs, supra note 19, at 515; see also
Robert B. Keatinge, supra note 74 (noting that Rev. Rul. 88-76 was issued after eight years
of study, and "marked a significant shift in the IRS' policy with respect to entities in which
the liability of the owners is limited to the owners' investment."). Others have more infor-
mally suggested that the change might have been attributable to the change in administra-
tions following the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan.
86. Before the issuance of Rev. Rul. 88-76 only two states, Wyoming and Florida,
which enacted LLC legislation in 1982, had LLC statutes. Susan Pace Hamill, The Taxa-
tion of Domestic Limited Liability Companies and Limited Partnerships: A Case for Elimi-
nating the Partnership Classification Regulations, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 565, 566 n.4 (1995). In
1990, two additional states (Colorado and Kansas) enacted LLC statutes and in 1991 four
more (Nevada, Texas, Utah and Virginia) joined the club. Id. The movement then seemed
to spread eastward and in 1992, ten more states, including Delaware, passed LLC legisla-
tion. Id. The number grew the following year, with eighteen more states enacting LLC
legislation, and by the close of 1994, nearly all states had LLC statutes and those that had
not yet adopted them had them pending. Id. By 1997, when the Check-the-Box regula-
tions became effective, all states had LLC legislation. Scott D. Smith, What are States
Doing on the Check-the-Box Regs?, TAX NOTES TODAY 159-41, Aug. 18, 1997, LEXIS, 97
TNT 159-41. Thus, the issuance of Rev. Rul. 88-76 led to a phenomenon not unlike that
which has resulted in the incorporation of many corporations in Delaware and which econ-
omists have dubbed a race to the bottom, although that view has been questioned. See
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering
the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 553-55 (2002).
87. In 1995, the Service issued Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-1 C.B. 501, providing the condi-
tions under which it would issue a ruling that an LLC would be treated as a partnership for
tax purposes. The existence of a procedure specifically dealing with LLC ruling requests
suggests that the Service was receiving such requests in numbers high enough to justify
implementing procedures for standardizing the process. Rev. Proc. 95-10 did not apply to
single-member entities, however; section 4.01 thereof specifically provided that "[t]he Ser-
vice will consider a ruling request that relates to classification of an LLC as a partnership
for federal tax purposes only if the LLC has at least two members ... "
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prevent classification as an association had little non-tax significance, the
decision to be structured in a way that would result in classification as an
association depended only on whether the taxpayer wanted the corporate
tax, and Subchapter C of the Code, to apply.88
The essentially elective system that resulted after the issuance of Rev.
Rul. 88-76 was theoretically unjustifiable in light of Morrissey. In Morris-
sey, the Court had provided for corporate taxation of entities that resem-
bled corporations; equity would be achieved because the tax law would
treat as corporations all entities that shared significant corporate charac-
teristics. Likes would be treated alike. In the nearly thirty years that
elapsed between the issuance of the Kintner regulations and the issuance
of Rev. Rul. 88-72, the government had moved away from the resem-
blance test so much that equal treatment of entities that closely resem-
bled one another had become impossible.8 9 Entities that were essentially
alike were treated differently if there were minor differences in their or-
ganizational documents-differences that had little effect upon the oper-
ation of the entity or the legal relationship between its members.
II. THE CHECK-THE-BOX REGULATIONS
A. PROPOSING AN ELECrIVE SYSTEM
Having made an incremental journey to an essentially elective system
of entity classification, after the issuance of Rev. Rul. 88-76 the Treasury
and the Service were faced with a dilemma: the Service could continue to
issue private letter rulings applying the Kintner regulations to comfort
skittish taxpayers on the classification of their LLCs,90 or the Treasury
could change the regulations so that taxpayers could easily make that de-
termination for themselves, thus improving the administration of the tax
88. See NYSBA Tax Section, Report on the 'Check-the-Box' Entity Classification Sys-
tem Proposed in NOTICE 95-14, TAX NoTEs TODAY, Aug. 30, 1995, LEXIS, 95 TNT 173-64;
ABA Section of Taxation, Comments on NOTICE 95- 14, 1995-14 I.R.B. 7, Proposed Revi-
sions to the Entity Classification Rules, TA NoTEs TODAY, July 17, 1995 LEXIS, 95 TNT
145-25.
89. Professor Victor Fleischer has argued that in combination with I.R.C. § 7704(b),
the Check-the-Box regulations implement the Morrissey resemblance test because they
produce a regime in which all entities that resemble corporations are treated as corpora-
tions (§ 7704), and all other unincorporated organizations are treated as partnerships. See
Fleischer, supra note 62, at 524. The only significant difference between the Check-the-Box
regulations and the Kintner regulations is that the former make access to capital markets-
being publicly traded-the only test of corporate resemblance, whereas the latter took four
factors into account. In effect, Professor Fleischer argues, the combination of the Check-
the-Box regulations and § 7704 provides for only one test of corporate resemblance: access
to capital markets. Id. at 542. While I think that Professor Fleischer's observation is as-
tute, I disagree with his conclusion that the Check-the-Box regulations return us to Morris-
sey. The ability to elect corporate status (and some LLCs actually make such an election)
creates a situation in which entities are treated as corporations for tax purposes even if
they do not resemble corporations in the way Professor Fleischer deems primarily impor-
tant because they are not publicly traded. It is the elective nature of the regulations that
separates substance from taxation, and fundamentally distinguishes the Check-the-Box
regulations from the corporate resemblance test of Morrissey.
90. See note 92 infra.
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system. In 1995, the Treasury and the Service chose the latter course. In
Notice 95-14,91 the Treasury and the Service explained that:
The existing classification regulations are based on the historical dif-
ferences under local law between partnerships and corporations.
However, many states recently have revised their statutes to provide
that partnerships and other unincorporated organizations may pos-
sess characteristics that have traditionally been associated with
corporations, thereby narrowing considerably the traditional distinc-
tions between corporations and partnerships....
One consequence of the narrowing of the differences under local law
between corporations and partnerships is that taxpayers can achieve
partnership tax classification for a non-publicly traded organization
that in all meaningful respects, is virtually indistinguishable from a
corporation. Taxpayers and the Service, however, continue to ex-
pend considerable resources in determining the proper classification
of domestic unincorporated business organizations. For example,
since the issuance of Rev. Rul. 88-76, the Service has issued seven-
teen revenue rulings analyzing individual state limited liability com-
pany statutes, and has issued several revenue procedures and
numerous letter rulings relating to classification of various unincor-
porated organizations under the classification regulations. In addi-
tion, small unincorporated organizations may not have sufficient
resources and expertise to apply the current classification regulations
to achieve the tax classification they desire. 92
91. I.R.S. Notice 95-14, 1995-14 I.R.B. 7.
92. Id. As Michael Thomson, Treasury Acting Deputy Tax Legislative Counsel is re-
ported to have said at a May 11, 1995 lunch meeting of the District of Columbia Bar Tax
Section,
It's a resource allocation question,... Too many resources have been wasted
both by the IRS and the private sector in resolving classification issues, even
though in the end the taxpayer gets the desired status .... Classification
becomes a very intricate game that if you have counsel you get out of the
maze and you're home free. In this context, allowing taxpayers a simple
choice causes little if any substantive change....
Rod Garcia, Treasury Officials Discuss Entity Choice of Tax Status, TAX NoTEs TODAY,
May 12, 1995, LEXIS, 95 TNT 93-4. During the hearings on the Check-the-Box proposal,
Susan Pace Hamill, then an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Alabama
School of Law but, previously in Branch I of Passthroughs, observed that there had been
"approximately 900 Private Letter Rulings issued in classification, as well as countless tele-
phone advice and other informal activity upon the government to help taxpayers out."
I.R.S., Unofficial Transcript of July 20 IRS Hearing on Entity Classifications, TAX NoTEs
TODAY, July 20, 1995, LEXIS, 95 TNT 144-27 [hereinafter July 20 Unofficial Transcript];
see also Sheryl Stratton, IRS Proposes "Check the Box" Partnership Classification Proce-
dure, TAX NoTEs TODAY, Mar. 30, 1995, LEXIS, 95 TNT 62-3 (describing the proposal as
"part of the IRS's attempt to engage in 'consensual rulemaking' promoted by the Clinton
administration's regulatory reform initiative.").
Notice 95-14 was the Treasury Department's response to "President Clinton's vow to
restore common sense to government regulations." See Fleischer, supra note 62, at 518
(citing Department of the Treasury, Treasury's Summary Report on President's Regulatory
Reform Initiatives, TAX NoTEs TODAY, Sept. 11, 1995, LEXIS, 95 TNT 176-33 and Rick
Wartzman, Clinton Directs Agencies To Identify Burdensome Rules, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22,
1995, at B12); Susan Pace Hamill, A Case for Eliminating the Partnership Classification
Regulations, TAX NoTEs TODAY, July 17, 1995, LEXIS, 95 TNT 141-65.
[Vol. 59
Paradise Kept
The Treasury and the Service therefore proposed to amend the Kintner
regulations "to allow taxpayers to elect to treat domestic unincorporated
business organizations as partnerships or as corporations for federal tax
purposes."93
The reaction of tax professionals to Notice 95-14 was overwhelmingly
positive.94 Practitioners generally applauded the administrative conve-
nience wrought by the advent of clear rules and urged prompt adoption
of the proposed system as well as its extension to the international area.
1. The Problem of Single Member LLCs
The elective approach suggested in Notice 95-14 by its terms would
have applied only to organizations with two or more associates. 95 Notice
95-14 did not address the classification of single member LLCs. The gov-
ernment's unwillingness to extend the elective treatment proposed in No-
tice 95-14 to single member entities reflected longstanding ambivalence
over the treatment of such entities.96 Although the Service had previ-
ously taken the position that a single member entity could not be a part-
nership,97 it had taken varying positions on what such an entity could be.
In at least two cases and several PLRs, the Service had taken the posi-
tion that a single member entity (a trust with a single beneficiary) en-
93. I.R.S. Notice 95-14, 1995-14 I.R.B. 7. In Notice 95-14, the Treasury and the Service
also said that they were considering providing elective treatment for foreign entities. Id.
The system that applies in the case of foreign entities differs from that applicable to domes-
tic entities and is generally beyond the scope of this article.
94. Commentators noted that although the then-current system was essentially elec-
tive, significant resources were devoted to ensuring that an entity met the arbitrary and
arcane requirements of the Kintner regulations. Many believed that the regime advocated
in Notice 95-14 would largely simplify the classification regime without materially changing
the overall substantive results. Others observed that the elective approach advocated by
Notice 95-14 provided more equitable results, noting that the then-current system was
largely elective for only for those with an extensive knowledge of the tax law. See ABA
Section of Taxation, supra note 88; see also Fleischer, supra note 62, at n.7; I.R.S., supra,
note 92; NYSBA Tax Section, supra note 88. But see Aaron Brooks, Chuck the Box: Pro-
posed Entity Classification Regulations Bring Bad Policy, TAX NoTEs TODAY, Mar. 18,
1996, LEXIS, 95 TNT 57-114 (arguing that entity classification was not mere formalism and
should not become formalistic; a formalistic system such as Check-the-Box would be hori-
zontally inequitable because it would tax similar entities dissimilarly).
95. See supra note 94.
96. Treasury was concerned about the consequences of treating single-member LLCs
as pass-throughs. For example, at a meeting of the New York State Bar Association Tax
Section on January 23, 1995, Deputy Tax Legislative Counsel Michael Thomson is reported
to have observed that, "We still have reservations about having an entity that is a nothing
for tax purposes." Lee A. Sheppard, NYSBA Tax Section Checks Out Check-the-Box, TAX
NoTEs TODAY, Jan. 25, 1996, LEXIS, 26 TNT 17-3.
97. See, e.g., I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,395, 1985 IRS GCM LEXIS 72 (Aug. 5,
1985) (stating "we believe that no single-member organization possesses associates in the
partnership sense and that an organization with only a single-member cannot be a partner-
ship."). The Government continued to take this position after issuing Notice 95-14.
Before the hearings on Notice 95-14 were held, Deputy Tax Legislative Counsel Michael
Thomson reportedly did "not view single-member LLCs as partnerships." Rod Garcia,
Service LLC Check-the-Box Hearing Set for Thursday, TAX NoTEs TODAY, July 19, 1995,
LEXIS, 95 TNT 140-6. This position is consistent with that reflected in Rev. Proc. 95-10,
1995-1 C.B. 501, in which the IRS refused to consider ruling that an LLC with fewer than
two members was a partnership.
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gaged in business could be said to have associates and thus be an
association for tax purposes.98 Although such an organization could not
be a partnership because it did not have associates "in the partnership
sense," 99 that conclusion did not end the inquiry. In evaluating whether
the organization had associates for purposes of determining whether it
was an association, both the Service and the courts concluded that the
relevant inquiry was whether the organization was engaged in business
for profit. If it was, the organization would more closely resemble a cor-
poration than a trust, such as an ancestral trust. A trust engaged in busi-
ness was therefore held to be an association even though it had only one
beneficiary.100
The foregoing analysis followed from applying the Kintner regulations,
under which the characteristics common to the two organizations being
compared were disregarded and only those characteristics not usually
common to both organizations were considered. Since corporations and
trusts both had centralization of management, limited liability, and free
transferability of interests, the question came down to whether trusts also
had associates and an objective to carry on a business for profit. The
Service and the courts concluded that trusts possessing associates and an
objective to carry on business for profit would be taxable as associations.
The existence of associates and an objective to carry on a business for
profit prevented them from being taxed as trusts.
General Counsel Memorandum ("GCM") 39,395 presented a some-
what more complicated situation.10 1 There, the Service again concluded
that the trust in question had associates because it had an objective to
carry on business and could not be treated as a trust. However, when the
Service examined whether the other four corporate characteristics were
present, it concluded that only two out of the four existed; therefore the
trust could not be treated as an association for tax purposes. Since the
trust could not be treated as a partnership because of the Service's posi-
98. Lombard Trs., Ltd. v. Comm'r, 136 F.2d 22 (9th Cir. 1943); Hynes v. Comm'r, 74
T.C. 1266 (1983) (treating trusts as associations taxable as corporations). Quoting Morris-
sey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 357 (1935), the Tax Court noted that "'the ultimate test
is resemblance and not identity' to corporate form," and concluded that a trust with a
single beneficiary could be taxable as an association because the beneficiary bore the same
relationship to the trust as a single shareholder would to a corporation. Hynes, 74 T.C. at
1279-1280. Because Treas. Reg. § 3017701-4(b) (1960) distinguishes between trusts created
to protect or conserve property for beneficiaries and other arrangements, once it is clear
that the trust has not been established for the former purpose it is impossible to conclude
that it is a trust for tax purposes. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-52-017 (Sept. 27, 1988);
Business Trust Will Be Taxes as Either an Association or a Partnership, TAX NoTEs TODAY,
Jan. 4. 19897 LEXtS, 89 TNT 3-41; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 85-52-010 (Sept. 25, 1985); I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 85-33-003 (May 7, 1985). The Service cited Hynes as authority for its conclu-
sion in these letter rulings, observing that: "under Hynes a single-member organization can
be treated as having associates for purposes of determining if it is an association, no single-
member organization possesses associates in the partnership sense and an organization
with only a single-member cannot be a partnership." I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 85-33-003 (May
7, 1985).
99. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 85-33-003 (May 7, 1985).
100. See Lombard Trs., Ltd., 136 F.2d at 22; Hynes, 74 T.C. at 1266.
101. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,395 (Aug. 5, 1985).
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tion that despite the existence of associates for association purposes "no
single-member organization possesses associates in the partnership
sense," the Service concluded that the organization "should be treated as
* * * making investments through an agent (the trustee).1102 Presumably,
the omitted information represented by the asterisks was the identity of
the beneficiary, so that the trust was treated as an agent of the benefici-
ary. In coming to this conclusion, the Service was treating the trust as a
pass-through that was not a partnership and also presumably not a gran-
tor trust. The seeds of the disregarded entity were planted. A trust with
a single beneficiary could now be either an association or an agent that
was not a separate taxpayer.
After Notice 95-14 was issued, it became clear that the Treasury was
going to have to take a position on the treatment of single-member enti-
ties. 103 Although single-member LLCs were not authorized under all of
the state LLC statutes existing at that time, they were permitted under
some state statutes; it was easy to imagine that single-member LLCs
would eventually be permitted everywhere if such entities received
favorable tax treatment, just as LLCs had become universally available
once the Service began to issue favorable rulings.10 4 Tax professionals
also recognized the need to address the question of how to treat single
member LLCs, and wasted little time publicly urging inclusion of single
member LLCs in the forthcoming guidance, although there was some dis-
agreement on just how such entities ought to be treated. Some commen-
tators suggested an expansion of the definition of partnership to include
such entities, while others preferred treating such entities as proprietor-
ships or branches.10 5 Although the Treasury did not waver in its position
102. Id.
103. Sheryl Stratton, IRS Set to Address LLC Problems, Official Tells AICPA Panel,
TAX NoTEs TODAY, June 8, 1995, LEXIS, 95 TNT 111-12 (stating that "[Diana K. Miosi,
senior technician reviewer in the office of the Assistant Chief Counsel (Passthrough and
Special Industries)] fended off the usual unremitting questions on the Service's prohibition
against single-member LLCs by stating that no final decisions resolving the issue will be
made until after the July 20 hearing on the 'check the box' proposal . . . 'We are still
figuring out what position to take,' she offered. 'We are aware that the issue is not going
away."').
104. That is precisely what happened. See Smith, supra note 86, providing background
and authority for the growth of state LLC statutes that permit single-member LLCs.
105. See, e.g., Rod Garcia, Single-Member LLCs: Basic Entities Raise Complex
Problems, TAX NoTEs TODAY, July 13, 1995, LEXIS, 95 TNT 136-6; Garcia, supra note 92;
July 20 Unofficial Transcript, supra note 92; Richard M. Leder, Association of the Bar of the
City of New York Favors Extending Check-the-Box Election to Single Member Entities, For-
eign Organizations, TAX NoTEs TODAY, Aug. 24, 1995, LEXIS, 95 TNT 166-43 (urging
pass-through treatment for tax purposes but not branch treatment (preserving entity treat-
ment) where such treatment for partnership attributes was appropriate to prevent taxpay-
ers from having a choice of branch or partnership treatment); Alvin D. Lurie, Lurie Says
'Check-the-Box' Entity Classification Procedure Should be Extended to One-Member Enti-
ties, TAx NOTES TODAY, June 15, 1995, LEXIS, 95 TNT 116-46 (urging elective classifica-
tion for single-member entities); David S. Neufeld, Association Says Check-the-Box
Proposal Should Apply to Unincorporated Entities, TAx NoTEs TODAY, July 6, 1995,
LEXIS, 95 TNT 147-44 (urging treatment as proprietorship or branch); New York State
Society of Certified Public Accountants, New York State CPAs Say Time Is Now for Gui-
dance on Classification of Single Member Organizations, TAX NoTEs TODAY, Sept. 1,
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that a single-member entity could not be a partnership, statements by
Treasury officials suggested that the rationale of GCM 39,395 was appar-
ently taking root and that the Treasury was considering treating single
member entities as sole proprietorships. 10 6
B. THE PROPOSED CHECK-THE-Box REGULATIONS
Following hearings held on July 20, 1995,107 the Treasury issued pro-
posed Check-the-Box regulations on May 9, 1996, 108 and held hearings
on the proposed regulations on August 21, 1996.109 The proposed regula-
tions did precisely what Notice 95-14 said they would do. They replaced
the standard-based, indeterminate system of the Kintner regulations with
a binary system of classification in which entities are classified either as
corporations, which are separate taxpayers subject to an entity-level tax,
or as pass-through entities whose activities are taxed to their owners, but
which are not subject to any entity-level tax. Under the Check-the-Box
regulations, the classification of an entity depends only on the answer to
two questions, each of which can only be answered "yes" or "no." The
first question is whether the entity was incorporated under state law. If
1995, LEXIS, 95 TNT 179-21 (acknowledging the possibility of taxing single-member LLCs
as proprietorships but urging taxation as partnerships on the ground of simplicity); Daniel
Shefter, Check the Box Partnership Classification: A Legitimate Exercise in Tax Simplifica-
tion, TAx NoTEs TODAY, Apr. 13, 1995, LEXIS, 95 TNT 72-44; Seth M. Zachary & An-
drew M. Short, Attorneys Say Check-the-Box Proposal Should Include Single Owner
Organizations, Unincorporated foreign Entities, TAX NoTEs TODAY July 13, 1995, LEXIS,
95 TNT 140-57 (no specific recommendation on how single-member entities should be
treated).
106. Before the hearings on Notice 95-14 were held, Deputy Tax Legislative Counsel
Michael Thomson reportedly did "not view single-member LLCs as partnerships. How-
ever, he [had] not necessarily dismissed the possibility that one-member LLCs can merit
treatment as sole proprietorships for tax purposes." Garcia, supra note 97. This position is
consistent with that reflected in Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-1 C.B. 501, in which the IRS refused
to consider ruling that an LLC with fewer than two members was a partnership.
107. Fourteen speakers were scheduled to testify at the Hearings, but only thirteen ap-
peared. Although most of the testimony concerned extending the Check-the-Box regime
to foreign entities, the four speakers who addressed the issues raised by single-member
entities all supported the extension of the Check-the-Box regime to such entities. July 20
Unofficial Transcript, supra note 92.
108. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,989 (May 13, 1996), reprinted in Pro-
posed "Check-the-Box" Regs Issued: Special Rules Provided for Foreign Entities, Single-
Member Entities, TAx NoTEs TODAY, May 9, 1996, LEXIS, 96 TNT 93-1.
109. The testimony at the hearings was generally positive, with the majority of com-
ments being requests for clarity in very specific areas. Most commentators noted that the
regulations would substantially reduce the level of resources then devoted to entity classifi-
cation issues as well as provide a more equitable result for all taxpayers. However, there
was much concern surrounding the definition of "limited liability," and whether a single-
member LLC should be recognized for federal tax purposes. Some argued that if those
entities were not recognized, the compliance issues would simply shift from the govern-
ment to the fifty states, as each state would adopt its own rules regarding such entities; they
therefore argued that single-member LLCs should automatically be classified as corpora-
tions. Other commentators felt that the disregarded entity classification was acceptable,
although still others wished there were more specific rules regarding the operation and
ownership of such entities. I.R.S. Unofficial Transcript of IRS Hearing on Check-the-Box




the answer is "yes", the entity will be treated as a corporation for federal
tax purposes and will therefore be subject to an entity level tax-end of
story. However, if the answer to that first question is 'no' (because the
entity is not incorporated under state law), there is a second question.
The second question is whether the entity has elected to be treated as a
corporation for federal income tax purposes. If the answer to that second
question is 'no' (because the entity has made no election), then the entity
will be treated as a partnership if it has multiple owners.
The Check-the-Box regulations thus provided an elective regime under
which unincorporated organizations with more than one member would
be treated as partnerships unless they elected to be treated as corpora-
tions.110 But the proposed regulations went further than Notice 95-14 by
also providing that a single member unincorporated organization (an
LLC) that did not elect to be treated as a corporation would be disre-
garded as an entity separate from its owner.111 Thus, the disregarded en-
tity was conceived.
Tax professionals again generally praised the Treasury's decision to cre-
ate the disregarded entity, 112 although some were quick to point out that
treating a disregarded entity as a tax-nothing would sometimes provide a
very different result than treating it as a partnership. 113
110. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,989.
111. In the Supplementary Information, the Treasury reiterated its long-standing posi-
tion that because "a fundamental characteristic of a partnership is the presence of associ-
ates, an entity with a single owner cannot conduct business as a partnership." Id. at 21,991.
It went on to explain that
the proposed regulations permit a business entity with a single owner that is
not required to be classified as a corporation to elect to be classified as an
association or to have the organization disregarded as an entity separate
from its owner (in which case the business activity is treated for federal tax
purposes in the same manner as if it were conducted as a sole proprietorship,
branch, or division of the organization's owner).
Id. at 21,991-92.
112. Sheryl Stratton, ABA Tax Section Meeting: Government Gets Accolades for Check-
the-Box Rules, TAX NoTEs TODAY, May 13, 1996, LEXIS, 96 TNT 94-4. One notable
dissenting voice was Glenn L. Rigby of the California Franchise Tax Board, who objected
to disregarding the separate existence of single-member entities on the ground that in
states like California, which follow federal entity classification for many state purposes but
which also impose an entity level tax on entities that enjoy limited liability, single-member
LLCs would benefit from anomalous treatment that would allow them to enjoy the bene-
fits of limited liability without having to pay an entity level tax. California's Franchise Tax
Board later issued Notice 96-5, refusing to incorporate the federal entity classification and
issued a regulation adopting the Kintner regulations' approach to entity classification for
California state tax purposes. Amy Hamilton, Check-the-Box Chaos? The State Tax Treat-
ment Factor, TAX NoTEs TODAY, May 29, 1997, LEXIS, 97 TNT 103-1; Glenn L. Rigby,
California Franchise Board Opposes Single-Member Business Entity Election, TAX NoTEs
TODAY, Aug. 21, 1996, LEXIS, 96 TNT 164-23. California has now enacted a statutory
provision whereby entities will be classified for state purposes in the same way they entity
are classified for federal purposes: CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 23038(b)(2)(B) (West 2006).
113. See, e.g., Michael L. Schler, Initial Thoughts on the Proposed "Check-the-Box"
Regulations, TAX NoTEs TODAY, June 17, 1996, LEXIS, 96 TNT 118-79.
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D. THE CHECK-THE Box REGULATIONS BECOME FINAL
On December 17, 1996, the Check-the-Box regulations became final,
and the disregarded entity was bom.1 1 4 Like the proposed regulations,
the final regulations provided that a single member unincorporated entity
that did not elect to be treated as a corporation for federal tax purposes
would be disregarded as an entity separate from its owner for such pur-
poses.115 The idea was simple and elegant. In promulgating the Check-
the-Box regulations and creating the disregarded entity, the Treasury and
the Service intended to convert the mud of entity classification into a
crystal-bright lines, sharp edges and distinct shapes. 116 For a while, they
succeeded.
III. THE RULING DELUGE BEGINS
Despite the crystalline beauty of a rule, the siren call of the equity that
can be achieved by the application of a nuanced standard is hard to ig-
nore. In the case of disregarded entities, the Service publicly resisted the
call, but in private guidance, it quickly found the lure of substance too
strong to resist.
A. EARLY REVENUE RULINGS-CRYSTAL CLEAR
In its first published rulings the Service did just what the Check-the-
Box rules mandated: The Service analyzed transactions as if the disre-
garded entity did not exist. In the first ruling, Revenue Ruling 99-5, the
Service ruled that when a single owner LLC acquired an additional owner
it became a partnership, and confirmed that the manner in which the ac-
quisition occurred would determine the tax consequences.' 17 If the new
owner dealt directly with the single owner, the new owner was treated as
114. The regulations became effective on January 1, 1997. Although their validity has
been questioned and debated, it has thus far been judicially upheld. Littriello v. United
States, No. 3:04CV-143-H, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9813 (W.D. Ky. May 18, 2005), reh'g
denied, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15950 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 3, 2005). See Polksy supra note 62;
see also J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., REVIEW OF SELECTED ErITY CLASSIFICA-
TION AND PARTNERSHIP TAX ISSUES 13-17 (Comm. Print 1997); Gregg Polsky, Point: Trea-
sury Should Not Have Promulgated the Check-the-Box Regulations, 23 ABA TAX SEC.
NEWSQUARTERLY 14 (2004); McKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND
PARTNERS para. 3.08 (3d ed. 1997); Dougan et al., "Check The Box"-Looking Under The
Lid, 75 TAX NOTES 1141, 1143-1144, (1997); George Mundstock, A UNIFIED APPROACH
To SUBCHAPTERS K & S, 11 n.33 (2002) (these last three authorities were cited by Judge
Halpern in Dover Corp. v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 324, 331 n.7 (2004)); but see Jasper L.
Cummings, Jr., Counterpoint: Treasury Acted Properly in Issuing the Check-the-Box Regu-
lations, 23 ABA TAX SEC. NEWSQUARTERLY 15 (2004).
115. Although the final regulations were not identical to the proposed regulations,
many of the changes were definitional or ministerial, rather than substantive. Notable sub-
stantive changes included fleshing out the portion of the regulations describing wholly
owned entities, probably in response to the call by practitioners for more explanation sur-
rounding these entities. See IRS Hearings, supra note 109.
116. See generally Rose, supra note 12.
117. Rev. Rul. 99-5, 1999-1 C.B. 34.
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acquiring assets from the old owner. 118 When the single owner transfers
part of her interest in the LLC to the new owner, the LLC is a single
member entity and does not exist separately from its owner. For tax pur-
poses, the single owner can only be transferring the assets represented by
that interest because for tax purposes the entity does not exist. Once the
transferee holds an interest in the entity, the entity has two owners and
can no longer be disregarded. If no election is made, the entity will there-
fore have become a partnership. 119
The analysis in the first situation in Revenue Ruling 99-5 was crystal-
line and pure, and the analysis in the second situation was almost like-
wise. In the second situation, the new owner did not deal with the old
single owner but instead dealt directly with the entity: the new owner
transferred money directly to the LLC in exchange for a 50% interest in
the LLC. 120 The Service concluded that when the LLC received the
money from the new owner the LLC became a partnership. It therefore
treated both the new owner and the old owner as if they had made contri-
butions to a partnership in exchange for a partnership interest. 121 The
118. In Rev. Rul. 99-5, 1991-1 C.B. 34, the Service described the tax consequences of
two transactions whereby a single-member entity acquires more than one owner and thus
ceases to be a disregarded entity and becomes a partnership. In the first situation, A, the
owner of an LLC which was a disregarded entity for tax purposes, sells half of his interest
in the LLC to B, an unrelated third party, for $5,000, and the two continue to operate the
LLC. The Service concludes that A's sale of half of his interest in the LLC to B will be
treated as a sale of 50% of each of the LLC's assets to B. The result of this portion of the
transaction is that A recognizes gain or loss as a result of the deemed sale. The Service
then concludes that immediately after the deemed sale of 50% of the LLC's assets by A to
B, both A and B are treated as contributing their shares of the LLC's assets to a partner-
ship in exchange for partnership interests. The result of this portion of the transaction is
that no gain or loss is recognized to either A or B as a result of § 721, and A's basis in his
partnership interest is the same as his basis in the half of the LLC's assets he is treated as
contributing to the partnership as a result of § 722. B's basis in his partnership interest is
also the same as his basis in the half of the LLC's assets he is treated as contributing to the
partnership, but since he was treated as having bought the assets for $5,000, he has a $5,000
(cost) basis in his partnership interest.
119. See id.
120. In the second situation, the new owner contributed $10,000 to the LLC in ex-
change for a 50% ownership interest in the entity, which had assets worth $5,000. Since the
new owner's contribution transformed the LLC into a partnership, the new owner was
treated as making a contribution to the partnership in exchange for a partnership interest,
and the old single owner was treated as having contributed the assets of the LLC to a
partnership. Consequently, neither the old single owner nor the new owner will recognize
gain or loss as a result of § 721. A, the old single owner, will have a basis in his partnership
interest that is the same as his basis in the LLC's assets, and B, the new owner, will have a
basis in his partnership interest of $10,000 under § 722.
121. Although the Service reached the correct result in the second situation of Rev.
Rul. 99-5, there is arguably one way in which the Service might have made its analysis even
clearer. What makes the second situation in Rev. Rul. 99-5 so interesting is that the LLC is
a disregarded entity until the instant that it acquires a second owner, at which time it
becomes a partnership. At that moment, it is transformed. The analytical question is how
that transformation should be characterized. One possibility is simply to say that the new
owner's contribution effects the transformation. The conceptual problem with that (con-
cededly not a large one) is that one could wonder how the new owner can make a contribu-
tion that has such transformative tax effect when the entity to which the contribution is
made did not exist for tax purposes at the time of the contribution. In other words, if the
entity is disregarded, why not treat the new owner as transferring property to the old
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Service's conclusions in both situations produced clear results that fol-
lowed directly from the application of the Check-the-Box regulations.
B. THE BANKRUPTCY REMOTE RULINGS-PRIVATE MUD
The first difficult issue that the Service ruled on privately required it to
determine whether an entity had more than one owner. In the Preamble
to the Check-the-Box regulations, the Treasury had made it clear that no
attribution rules applied for that purpose, thus apparently confirming that
in this area of the law, form would be king.122 Nevertheless, the Treasury
was soon asked to determine whether a corporation holding a legal inter-
est in an LLC, but not entitled to share in the profits of the LLC, would
be treated as an owner for purposes of determining whether the LLC had
more than one owner and therefore could not be treated as a disregarded
entity.
These ruling requests were motivated by transactions in which parties
seeking to engage in § 1031 like-kind exchanges needed to satisfy the
lender's insistence that the replacement property be placed in a bank-
ruptcy remote entity that would allow the lender to control the circum-
stances under which the owner could file for bankruptcy. 123 In the
typical ruling request, the taxpayer established an LLC in which the tax-
payer would be one member and a corporation wholly owned by the tax-
payer, described in at least one of the rulings as "Member 2," would be
another member. 124 The board of directors of the corporate member
would include at least one representative of the lender. The LLC agree-
ment provided that all of the decisions of the LLC would be made by the
taxpayer except that for so long as any amounts were due to the lender,
owner? Of course, the reason to eschew that analysis is that the end result is that the entity
has the money contributed by the new owner and another transaction would have to be
constructed to account for the end result of the transaction. However, a second possible
analysis would treat the two owners as individually agreeing to form a partnership, and
then treat the old single owner as making a constructive contribution to the partnership
simultaneously with the new owner's actual contribution of cash. While this latter analysis
produces the same result as the Service's instant transformation analysis, the analysis I
suggest is slightly more satisfying because it avoids the conceptual question whether a
transfer to a disregarded entity can be regarded just long enough to result in the creation of
a partnership.
122. The Preamble provides that "[t]he fact that some or all of the owners of an organi-
zation are under common control does not require the common parent to be treated as the
sole owner." T.D. 8697, 1997-1 C.B. 11, 215.
123. The creation of a bankruptcy remote entity was necessary because simply provid-
ing in the loan agreement that the trust would refrain from filing for bankruptcy protection
would not have achieved the desired effect. As a matter of public policy, courts will not
enforce a promise not to file for bankruptcy made by a party that is otherwise eligible to
file. Such a contractual obligation is considered repugnant to the purpose of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. See In re Weitzen, 3 F. Supp. 698, 698-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1933); see also In re
Madison, 184 B.R. 686, 690 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995); In re Wheeler, 122 B.R. 645, 648
(Bankr. D.R.I. 1991); In re George, 15 B.R. 247, 248-49 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981). Of
course, by ruling in a manner that facilitates the use of such entities, the Service is allowing
the Check-the-Box regulations to be used to circumvent settled bankruptcy policy. That is
yet another reason for the Service to change its position in these situations.
124. See e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Ruls. 1999-15-030 (Jan. 12, 1999); 1999-14-006 (Dec. 23,
1998); 1999-11-033 (Dec. 18, 1998).
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any decision to file for bankruptcy or take similar action would require
the approval of the corporate member, whose board of directors had to
agree unanimously. 125 Because the LLC could not file for bankruptcy
without the approval of the corporate member and because that approval
had to be unanimous, the lender would be able to block any such action
by simply instructing its representative on the corporate member's board
of directors to refrain from voting to approve such action.
Deciding that the LLC had a single member was crucial to the transac-
tion. If the LLC had a single member, the LLC would be a disregarded
entity and a transfer of the replacement property to it would be treated as
a transfer to its owner, thus qualifying the transfer for § 1031 treatment.
If the LLC had more than one member, the LLC would not be disre-
garded and a transfer of the property to it would not qualify for § 1031
treatment because the replacement property would be received by a tax-
payer other than the taxpayer who owned the transferred property.
Although the Service could have simply counted the number of owners
the LLC had and concluded that the LLC had more than one owner, thus
preventing it from being treated as a disregarded entity, it did not do that.
Apparently forgetting that by promulgating the Check-the-Box regula-
tions it had sought to adopt a rule to provide clarity and certainty, the
Service instead reverted to the Morrissey-like standard-based analysis in
which it analyzed the substantive attributes of the entity in order to deter-
mine its characterization. In contravention of the rule-based approach of
the Check-the-Box regulations, the Service reasoned as follows:
Since LLC is a domestic eligible entity and you have represented
that it will not file an election to be treated as a corporation, its fed-
eral tax classification depends upon the number of members of LLC.
The cases of Commissioner v. Tower,126 and Commissioner v. Cul-
bertson,127 provide general principles regarding the determination of
whether individuals have joined together as partners in a partner-
ship. The primary inquiry is whether the parties had the intent tojoin together to operate a business and share in its profits and losses.
125. For example, I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-11-033 (Dec. 18, 1998) explained that the
taxpayer had represented that,
[Flor so long as the loan from Lender is, [sic] outstanding without the ap-
proval of Member 2 (whose Board of Directors vote must be unanimous) the
LLC may not: (1) file or consent to the filing of a bankruptcy or insolvency
petition or otherwise institute insolvency proceedings; (2) dissolve, liquidate,
merge, consolidate, or sell substantially all of its assets; (3) engage in any
business activity other than those specified in its Certificate of Formation; (4)
borrow money or incur indebtedness other than the normal trade accounts
payable and any other indebtedness expressly permitted by the documents
evidencing and securing the loan from Lender; (5) take or permit any action
that would violate any provision of any of the documents evidencing or se-
curing the loan from Lender; (6) amend the Certificate of Formation con-
cerning any of the aforesaid items; or (7) amend any provision of the
Agreement concerning any of the aforesaid items. With respect to items 2
and 7, the LLC must have the prior written consent of the Lender.
126. 327 U.S. 280 (1946).
127. 337 U.S. 733 (1949).
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The inquiry is essentially factual and all relevant facts and circum-
stances must be examined. Furthermore, it is federal, not state, law
that controls for income tax purposes, regardless of how the parties
are treated under state law. 12 8
The problem with this reasoning is that it conflates the question of the
number of members with the question whether the entity should be
treated as a partnership. Because the Check-the-Box regulations aim to
treat as a partnership any unincorporated domestic entity that has more
than one member (unless a contrary election is made), the crystalline
structure of those regulations should have precluded an examination of
the question whether a particular multi-member entity will be classified
as a partnership under those regulations. Nothing in either the letter or
the spirit of the Check-the-Box regulations ties the determination of the
number of owners of an entity to the question of whether the entity ought
to be treated as a partnership. Indeed, just the opposite is true. In
promulgating the Check-the-Box regulations, the Treasury set out to
eradicate the notion that the characterization of an entity should be re-
lated, in any way, to its attributes. By making classification elective for
entities other than those incorporated under state law (for which the stat-
utory language provided no alternative) the Treasury eliminated any con-
nection between the attributes of an entity and its federal tax
classification. The Service's analysis in PLR 1999-11-033 and others of its
ilk ignore the elimination of that connection. 129
Suggesting that the Service should apply the Check-the-Box regula-
tions in a rule-like manner eschewing consideration of the question
whether an entity ought to be treated as a partnership when determining
how many members it has does not lead to a conclusion that it should
abandon all attempts at substantive analysis in this area. The point is one
about the ordering of the analysis. The Check-the-Box regulations
should determine the initial classification of an entity for federal tax pur-
poses: corporation, partnership, or no separate entity at all. Once that
determination has been made, the tax law will apply to that entity just as
it did before the advent of the Check-the-Box regulations. Therefore, if
128. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-11-033.
129. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. Although the question is crucial in the
§ 1031bankruptcy remote context addressed in the rulings described in the text, that is not
the only situation in which it arises or in which the Service has addressed it, consistently
looking to substance to make the determination. For example, in Chief Couns. Adv. Mem.
2005-01-001, 2004 I.R.S. CCA LEXIS 41 the Service was faced with an LLC that lacked
articles of organization or ownership documents and whose owner and authorized repre-
sentative provided inconsistent information on the question whether the LLC had one or
more owners. As it had in the bankruptcy remote context, the Service took the position
that the question of ownership required "an analysis of who has the benefits and burdens
and control of the entity" and would be "dependent on the facts and circumstances of each
case." It cited Grodt & McKay Realty, Inc. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1221, 1237-1228
(1981), a case in which the Tax Court analyzed the substance of a transaction to determine
ownership. In concluding that it lacked sufficient evidence to determine how many owners
the LLC had, the Service refused to employ suggested objective tests, such as whether only
one person had reported all of the income and expenses of the LLC on his return, insisting
instead on a substantively-based determination.
[Vol. 59
Paradise Kept
the Service wishes to apply a non-Check-the-Box-based doctrine to trans-
actions in which the entity engages, and, for example, refuse to recognize
a family limited partnership 130 or give effect to a transaction involving an
entity that has elected to be treated as a corporation, as the Court did in
Gregory,1 31 nothing in the analysis I am suggesting prevents that.
The Check-the-Box regulations should provide a clear first cut at entity
classification that answers the question: "For federal tax purposes, what
kind of entity are you?" The answer to that question provides a point of
departure that is subject to being altered by the application of other doc-
trines. My point is that there ought to be two separate questions. Ques-
tion 1 is, under the Check-the-Box regulations what type of organization
has been created? That question will arise often and should have a clear,
easily applied answer, which the rule of the Check-the-Box regulations
can provide. Question 2 is whether, despite the creation of such an or-
ganization, long-standing judicial and other doctrines (such as the part-
nership anti-abuse rule) 132 will preclude giving tax effect to what a
taxpayer has done. That second question will arise more infrequently and
a desire to retain the ability to ask it does not require muddying the an-
swer to the first question. Concluding that a partnership, rather than a
corporation or disregarded entity, has been created under the Check-the-
Box regulations should not preclude the application of judicial, regula-
tory or statutory anti-abuse rules any more than the actual creation of an
entity under state law does. That the Check-the-Box regulations answer
the question "what is it" need not mean that anti-abuse doctrines do not
apply to whatever "it" is or whatever it has done. Using the Check-the-
Box regulations to answer that first question, and no other, will allow
those regulations to continue to answer that question pristinely in the
large number of cases in which they will be called upon to do so. The rest
130. "Family partnerships were first used for tax purposes principally to shift income
from family members in higher income tax brackets to family members in lower income tax
brackets. Later, partnerships became a popular way to transfer wealth to younger family
members." See Tax Management Portfolios, Family Limited Partnerships and Limited Lia-
bility Companies 722, Oct. 18, 2004, at A4. The earliest cases recognized the partnership if
the entity was a valid partnership under state law. Id. Later cases ignored the partnership
if the purpose of the partnership was to shift income from the person entitled to the in-
come to other family members. Id. Currently, a person will "be recognized as a partner for
purposes of this subtitle if he owns a capital interest in a partnership in which capital is a
material income-producing factor, whether or not such interest was derived by purchase or
gift from any other person." I.R.C. § 704(e)(1) (2005). The regulations further stipulate
that there must be a complete transfer to the donee and that the transfer must occur in a
bona fide transaction, not a mere sham. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(1)(iii) (as amended in
2005). Currently, in determining whether a bona fide transaction exists, "the Tax Court
[has] emphasized whether the decedent was on both sides of the transaction; whether he
had retained sufficient assets or was, instead, dependent on distributions from the FLP;
whether there was a commingling of FLP assets; and whether there was an actual transfer
of assets to the FLP." See Susan Simmonds, Year in Review: IRS Wins Big, Loses Big, 110
TAX NoTEs 39 (2006).
131. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
132. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2 (as amended by T.D. 8592, 1995-1 C.B. 119 in 1995). The
Code itself also contains override rules and provides authority for the promulgation of
regulations to prevent abuse. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7701(f), (1).
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of the tax law can then apply in the appropriate manner to whatever the
organization is.
C. THE CRYSTALS RETURN, ALBEIT TEMPORARILY.
Despite its analytical misstep in the bankruptcy remote rulings, the Ser-
vice generally applied the Check-the-Box regulations in a rule-like way in
its public guidance, and the Treasury did likewise in issuing regulations.
Thus, Treasury Regulation § 1.368-2T provides that a merger of a corpo-
ration into a disregarded entity wholly owned by another corporation will
be treated as a merger of the merged corporation into the corporate
owner of the disregarded entity, and could qualify as a reorganization
under § 368(a)(1)(A). Although the Treasury did not reach this conclu-
sion easily, and was initially unwilling truly to disregard the separate exis-
tence of a single member LLC, that it reached that conclusion at all is
significant. 133 It shows that when forced to focus on the implications of
the Check-the-Box regulations, the Treasury is willing to take them to
their logical conclusion, and to do so consistently.1 34 The Service has
133. In the first set of proposed regulations on this subject, the Service took the posi-
tion that a merger of a single-member LLC into another corporation resulted in the divi-
sion of the assets held for tax purposes by the owner of the LLC and thus should be tested
as a § 355 divisive reorganization because § 355 should provide the only means to effect
divisive reorganizations. That first set of proposed regulations also took the position that a
merger of a target corporation into a disregarded entity did not qualify as an "A" reorgani-
zation because it was not a statutory merger of corporations under state law and because
the owner of the LLC is not a "party to a reorganization." These proposed regulations
were roundly criticized as being inconsistent with the rationale of the Check-the-Box regu-
lations and meeting all of the substantive requirements for statutory merger treatment. See
e.g., Steven A. Bank, Taxing Divisive and Disregarded Mergers, 34 GA. L. REV. 1523
(2000); Steven A. Bank, The Runaway "A" Train: Does the IRS Need New Brakes?, 87 TAX
NOTES 553 (2000); Steven A. Bank, Federalizing the Tax-Free Merger: Toward an End to the
Anachronistic Reliance on State Corporation Laws, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1307, 1367 (1999);
Group Criticizes Proposed Regs on Mergers Including DB Regarded Entities, TAX NoTEs
TODAY, Aug. 15, 2000, LEXIS, 2005 TNT 158-45; Members of ABA Tax Section Supple-
ment Comments on Proposed Regs on Mergers Involving Disregarded Entities, TAX NoTEs
TODAY, Aug. 2, 2001, LEXIS 2001 TNT 149-27; Nat'l Ass'n of REITS; Members of ABA
Tax Section Suggest Changes to Proposed Regs on Mergers Involving Disregarded Entities,
TAX NoTEs TODAY, Oct. 2, 2000, LEXIS, 2000 TNT 208-19.
In a new set of proposed regulations issued on November 13, 2001, the Treasury changed
its position on the treatment of the merger of a target into a disregarded entity and gener-
ally concluded that such transactions would qualify as "A" reorganizations. It did not
change its conclusion that a merger of a disregarded entity into a target corporation would
not qualify as an "A" reorganization, but that is reasonable, because disregarding the sepa-
rate existence of the entity means that the owner's assets are indeed being divided. In
January 2003, the Treasury revised the 2001 proposed regulations and issued the revised
version as temporary regulations. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2T(b) (2003). These tempo-
rary regulations retained the same format and general conclusions as the 2001 proposed
regulations, but contained additional examples and thus clarified the operation of the regu-
lations. Although the temporary regulations were amended since they were initially is-
sued, the amendments have not changed the fundamental approach, and the regulations
were made final on January 26, 2006. T.D. 9242, 2006-7 I.R.B. 422.
134. The Service started applying the revised analysis even before the temporary regu-
lations were issued. The depth of the Service's change of position with respect to its treat-
ment of disregarded entities involved in reorganizations is demonstrated by two PLRs it
issued before issuing the temporary regulations. In I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-36-005 (May
23, 2002), it ruled that a merger of the parent of an affiliated group into an LLC wholly
[Vol. 59
Paradise Kept
done likewise, applying the Check-the-Box regulations in a rule-like way
to disregarded entities even in the area of divisive reorganizations. 135
In Revenue Procedure 2002-69,136 the Service stayed true to the goal of
administrability by concluding that married couples in community prop-
erty states could choose whether to be treated as one taxpayer or as two
taxpayers, so that an LLC in which one or both spouses held an interest
owned by the acquiring corporation would be an "A" reorganization. In I.R.S. Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 2002-39-022 (June 25, 2002), the Service analyzed a transaction in which two newly
created single-member LLCs were disregarded and used to effect a successful split up
which qualified under § 355. The transaction included a merger of a subsidiary into the
parent's newly created single-member LLC, which was treated as a § 332 liquidation, and
the transfer of some businesses into another newly created single-member LLC, followed
by the contribution of the interests in the two LLCs to a newly created corporation in
exchange for the corporation's stock, which was then distributed to the contributor's share-
holders, qualified as a reorganization under § 368(a)(1)(D). For an extensive analysis of
the use of disregarded entities in merger and acquisitions see Michele Coad Shahroody &
David J. Stalter, Navigating a One-Way Street: Merging with Disregarded Entities Under the
New Temporary Regulations, Bus. ENTITIES, May/June 2003, at 4; Mark J. Silverman, Cur-
rent Developments in Tax-Free and Taxable Acquisitions and Separations, A.L.I.-A.B.A.
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. COURSE OF STUDY 787 (2002); Gregory W. Walkauskas, THE
TAX ADVISER 652 (2002). For some concerns involving the application of the temporary
regulations to subsequent asset transfers, particularly transfers to foreign disregarded enti-
ties, see Lewis R. Steinberg, NYSBA Comments on Regs Defining Statutory Merger or Con-
solidation, TAX NOTES TODAY, May 27, 2004, LEXIS, 2004 TNT 103-12.
135. In Rev. Rul. 2002-49, 2002-2 C.B. 288, the Service examined a situation where in
Year 1 each of two corporations owned a 20% interest in an LLC and others owned the
remaining 60%. The LLC owned, leased and managed several commercial office buildings
and was taxed as a partnership. In Year 3, one of the corporations, D, acquired the inter-
ests of the other parties, and the LLC became a disregarded entity. In Year 6, the LLC
transferred some of its buildings to a newly created corporation in exchange for all of the
new corporation's stock, and then D distributed that stock to its shareholders. The Service
ruled that the distribution of the new corporation's stock to D's shareholders satisfied the
five-year active business requirement of § 355(b). To reach this conclusion, the Service had
to treat the business conducted by the LLC when it was a single-member LLC as con-
ducted by D because in this situation § 355(b)(1)(A) requires that both the distributing
corporation and the controlled corporation be engaged in the conduct of a trade or busi-
ness actively conducted during the five-year period preceding the distribution. In addition,
the Service had to conclude that D's purchase of the other interests in the LLC, which
caused the LLC to go from being a partnership to being a disregarded entity, did not result
in the acquisition of a new trade or business. The Service's citation to Treas. Reg. § 1.355-
3(b)(3)(ii) (as amended in 1986), suggests that it did not regard the acquisition of addi-
tional properties by D as the acquisition of a new business. See Rev. Rul. 99-6, 1999-1 C.B.
432.
In the second situation, the only difference was that D did not start out owning its inter-
est in the LLC in Year 1, but rather acquired it in Year 2 by contributing appreciated
securities to the LLC in a transaction that qualified for non-recognition treatment under
§ 721. In that case the Service concluded that D would be treated as having acquired the
trade or business in a transaction in which gain or loss was recognized within the five-year
pre-distribution period notwithstanding the existence of a § 721 transaction because "had
D instead directly acquired the trade or business that the [membership] interest represents
in exchange for the property D contributed to the LLC, such exchange would have been a
transaction in which gain or loss was recognized." Rev. Rul. 2002-49, 2002-2 C.B. 288.
Although the Service's analysis of this situation looks to the substance of the transaction,
that substantive approach did not involve the characterization of the disregarded entity. A
number of letter rulings come to favorable conclusions on spin-offs involving disregarded
entities. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-34-021 (May 14, 2002); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-30-006
(Apr. 11, 2002); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-28-008 (Apr. 4,2002); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-
14-025 (Jan. 4, 2002).
136. Rev. Proc. 2002-69, 2002-45 I.R.B. 831.
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could be treated either as a disregarded entity or as a partnership. 137 Al-
though many questions about the application of the Check-the-Box regu-
lations in community property states remain, for purposes of this
discussion Revenue Procedure 2002-69 showed that the Service contin-
ued to favor administrability over substantive accuracy. 138
In Revenue Ruling 2004-77,139 the Service concluded that an LLC that
had two legal owners, a corporation and another LLC wholly owned by
the same corporation, was a disregarded entity. It could not be a partner-
ship, because for federal income tax purposes, it only had one owner-
the corporation. The LLC that was solely owned by the corporation was
disregarded, leaving the first LLC with only one owner for tax pur-
poses-the corporation. This conclusion is not surprising, as it follows
directly from the application of the Check-the-Box regulations. If the
separate existence of the second LLC is disregarded because it consists
only of the corporation, the result is that the only owner of the first LLC
is the corporation, thus making it a disregarded entity if it does not make
an election to the contrary.
137. Ownership of LLCs in community property states presents particularly thorny is-
sues. Even if an LLC owned by one member of a community were designated as separate
property, many would not necessarily be so designated, and all LLCs that are community
property would have to be treated as partnerships if that treatment depended on the num-
ber of individuals having ownership interests under state law. Since Poe v. Seaborn, 282
U.S. 101 (1930) gave effect to state community property laws for tax purposes, the Service
could not simply ignore the community ownership. Respecting the community ownership
would have created a significant disparity between common law property states and com-
munity property states, as no entity in which a married person acquired an interest in a
community property state could ever be disregarded (if the ownership interest were com-
munity property), so disregarded entities would be out of the reach of many, if not most,
married people in community property states but would be freely available to married
couples in common law property states. The conclusion the Service reached makes disre-
garded entities available to all married couples. It preserves the element of taxpayer
choice so central to the Check-the-Box regulations, while ignoring the substantive reality
that two individuals have an ownership interest in the LLC. It uses one rule prompted by
concerns over administrability to create another.
138. For example, in I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2003-39-026 (June 23, 2003), the Service ad-
dressed a situation involving community property ownership of LLCs as well as layers of
disregarded entities. In I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2003-39-026, the Service began by observing
that an LLC owned by individual, A, a married individual residing in a community prop-
erty state, was a disregarded entity, and that S corporations whose stock was owned by the
LLC qualified as such. The interesting twist in the ruling is that the married couple then
became settlors of a grantor trust that was revocable by either member of the couple, and
transferred the LLC interest to the trust. The Service then concluded that "following the
transfer of A and B's (emphasis added) ownership interest in LLC to Trust, Trust will be
the sole owner of LLC and, therefore LLC will be an eligible entity, disregarded as an
entity separate from its owner, unless it elects otherwise." I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2003-39-06.
The Service apparently treated the two individuals as a unit through their ownership in the
trust; otherwise, the LLC would have ceased to be a disregarded entity because it would
have gone from having one owner, A, to having two, A and B, as settlors of the trust which
is itself disregarded because it is a grantor trust. For other questions and an analysis that
predates Rev. Rul. 2002-69, see Terence F. Cuff, Attorney Suggests Issues to be Considered
for Future Guidance on Community Property Partnerships, TAX NoTEs TODAY, Sept. 12,
2002, LEXIS, 2002 TNT 177-3. For treatment of community property in like-kind ex-
changes, see Richard M. Lipton, The 'State of the Art' in Like-Kind Exchanges Revisited, 98
J. TAX'N 334 (June 2003).
139. Rev. Rul. 2004-77, 2004-31 I.R.B.119.
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Private guidance issued during this period also applied the regulations
in a rule-like fashion, with results that were in some ways predictable but
in other ways startling. The contrasting results reached in a technical ad-
vice memorandum ("TAM") and a PLR issued in 2001 provide a vivid
illustration of the consequences of applying the rule-based approach of
the Check-the-Box regulations and show that the difference between
100% ownership and 99% ownership matters. 140 In the TAM, the Ser-
vice ruled that an LLC in which the taxpayer corporation owned a 99%
interest, and two of its officers each owned a .5% interest, was a partner-
ship, and that the § 4261 excise tax applied to payments to the LLC.14 1
By contrast, in the PLR, the Service ruled that payments from a partner-
ship to a single member LLC of which the partnership was the sole owner
would not be subject to the § 4261 excise tax because the single member
LLC would be treated as a disregarded entity, with the result that the
payments would be treated as if they were made from one division of the
taxpayer to another.142 In addition, payments from each of two other
LLCs, of which the partnership was the only member, would not be sub-
ject to the § 4261 excise tax because they, too, would be treated as pay-
ments made by the taxpayer to itself.
The difference between the conclusions reached by the Service in the
TAM and the PLR follows precisely from an application of the Check-
140. A TAM is guidance issued by the Service in response to questions that develop
during a proceeding. TAMs are issued only on closed transactions and represent a final
determination of the position of the IRS on the correct application of tax law, treaties,
revenue rulings and other precedents, but only with respect to the specific issue in the
particular case in question. Thus, a TAM is the ex post equivalent to the PLR. Neverthe-
less, this ex post versus ex ante distinction does not account for the difference in result. See
Understanding IRS Guidance-A Brief Primer, available at http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/
0,,id=101102,00.html (for complete definitions of the PLR and TAM).
141. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2001-28-002 (Jan. 2, 2001). Technical advice was appar-
ently sought because § 4282(c) provided that the § 4261 excise tax did not apply to
amounts paid between members of an affiliated group under circumstances applicable to
the taxpayer corporation and the LLC. If the LLC and the taxpayer corporation had been
members of an affiliated group, the tax would not have applied to payments between them.
Because the taxpayer corporation owned 99% of the LLC and the other 1% was owned by
the taxpayer corporation's own officers, the taxpayer was apparently taking the position
that it ought to be treated as making the payments to a member of an affiliated group. In
substance, the taxpayer and the LLC represented the same economic interests. A standard
based approach would have resulted in treating the taxpayer and the LLC as members of
an affiliated group. Nevertheless, that is not how the Service analyzed the situation.
In I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2001-23-002 (June 8, 2001), the Service concluded that the
definition of an affiliated group applicable for purposes of § 4282(c) was that found in
§ 1504. Because the § 1504 definition includes only corporations as members of an affili-
ated group, the Service had to determine whether the LLC was a corporation for that
purpose. Id. For that determination, it looked to the Check-the-Box regulations and con-
cluded that the LLC was not a corporation because it had more than one owner and it had
not elected to be treated as a corporation for tax purposes. Because it was not a corpora-
tion, it could not be a member of an affiliated group and the exception to the application of
the § 4261 excise tax did not apply. If ownership of 99% of the LLC had been treated as
substantively the same as ownership of 100%, there would have been no need to invoke
the affiliated corporation exception because the LLC would have been a disregarded entity
and the payments would have been nonexistent for tax purposes (there would have been
payments within one entity, the taxpayer corporation and its then single-member LLC).
142. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-03-019 (Oct. 15, 2001).
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the-Box regulations. By their terms and design, the Check-the-Box regu-
lations leave no room for determining substantive equivalence. Substan-
tively, the difference between an LLC in which the taxpayer owns 100%
of the interest and one in which it owns 99% of the interest is illusory.
Indeed, in many areas of the tax law, ownership of 80% of the equity in
an entity is statutorily treated the same as ownership of 100% of the eq-
uity. 143 Nevertheless, by applying the Check-the-Box regulations in the
TAM and the PLR, the Service appropriately avoided a determination of
substantive equivalence. By doing so, it remained true to the objective of
the Check-the-Box regulations. By eschewing the standard of substantial
equivalence it avoided uncertainty.
As often occurs when a standard gives way to a rule, the contrast be-
tween the results in the TAM and PLR seem substantively unfair. The
two situations are nearly identical, yet they are treated in dramatically
different ways. For tax lawyers steeped in doctrines that seek to ensure
that similarly situated taxpayers are treated similarly, the differing results
in the TAM and PLR can seem almost shocking. Nevertheless, the differ-
ent results follow from the decision to adopt a rule in the Check-the-Box
regulations. The potential inequity of dissimilar treatment for similar sit-
uations is ameliorated by the taxpayer's ability to choose the desired
characterization given the elective nature of the Check-the Box regula-
tions.144 If both taxpayers had elected to have the LLC treated as a cor-
poration for tax purposes, the treatment of the two LLCs would have
been identical.
In some ways, the difference in the results reached in the TAM and the
PLR is not surprising. Rules always have this effect, which is evident in
the application of rules contained in the Code itself. 145 What is perhaps
startling here is that the application of the rule produced such a poten-
tially taxpayer friendly result in the PLR, suggesting that taxpayers can
manipulate the characterization of their transactions to produce either
the result of the TAM-respecting the separate identity of the LLC, or
not, as in the PLR. Of course, allowing taxpayers to choose was precisely
the point of the Check-the-Box regulations. That is why retaining the
rule-based approach of those regulations is so important.
143. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 246, 332, 368(c), 1504 (2001). Of course, this suggests that when
Congress wants to treat less than 100% ownership as equivalent to 100% ownership, it
specifically so provides. This is a rule-based area of the law where Congress, and the Trea-
sury through the promulgation of the Check-the-Box regulations, have chosen to eschew
determinations of substantive equivalence in favor of the administrative ease of applying a
rule.
144. It is interesting to consider the possibility that the TAM and PLR involved the
same taxpayer, who restructured its affairs after receiving the TAM and asked for the
Service's blessing through the PLR.
145. For example, in Kamborian v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 847 (1971), the court refused
to give effect to the acquisition of additional stock by an existing shareholder, leaving the
other transferors in a § 351 transaction holding only 77.3% of the stock. The court held
that § 351 would not apply to the transaction because the stock held by the transferors was
less than the required 80%. Close was not good enough.
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The TAM and PLR are not the only private guidance in which the Ser-
vice has been willing to apply the Check-the-Box regulations linearly
even when doing so produced a result very favorable to taxpayers. In
I.R.S. PLR 2002-22-026, the Service considered a situation in which an
LLC that had two owners redeemed the interest of one of its owners and
thus became a disregarded entity. 146 The Service found that the partner-
ship terminated as a result of the redemption, as it should have given
previously issued published guidance, 147 but the problem was that the
LLC (the partnership) had outstanding liabilities to the entity that be-
came its single owner. The Service therefore had to consider the question
whether the termination of the partnership gave rise to discharge of in-
debtedness income to the LLC. The Service concluded that "[b]ecause a
person cannot be both creditor and debtor, LLC's obligations [to its now-
single owner] are cancelled ... LLC is treated as paying the full issue
price of the cancelled out debts. Accordingly, neither LLC nor [its now-
single owner] will realize any discharge of indebtedness income.., upon
the termination of the partnership."' 14 8 The fact that the debt remained
outstanding as a matter of state law and might not be repaid, and that the
LLC received an amount as a separate entity which it might now fail to
repay without tax consequence, did not matter.
The Service has publicly underscored the extent to which it is willing to
stand by the rule-based application of the Check-the-Box regulations,
even when that approach allows taxpayers to change a result from tax-
payer-unfavorable to taxpayer-favorable status, and despite the absence
of any substantive change in the underlying relationships. Revenue Rul-
ing 2005-40149 dramatically illustrates this. In that ruling, the Service ex-
amined four situations and was called upon to decide whether in each
situation, corporation Y, a corporation unrelated to corporation X, was
providing insurance to X.
In the first situation, X carried on a courier transport business and
owned a fleet of motor vehicles that it used in that business.1 50 It paid Y
to insure the risks associated with the motor vehicles based on accepted,
arms-length industry rates. Nevertheless, because Y's only insurance ac-
146. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-22-026 (Mar. 1, 2002).
147. This result is mandated by Rev. Rul. 99-6, 1999-1 C.B. 432. In that Ruling, the
Service analyzed two situations in which one person purchased all of the interests in a
multi-person LLC, causing the LLC to change from a partnership to a disregarded entity.
Both situations are analyzed differently from the buyer's side and the seller's side. In both
situations, the seller(s) are treated as selling a partnership interest, which results in the
recognition of capital gain except to the extent of unrealized receivables or inventory
items, which are ordinary income. In both situations, from the buyer's side, the transaction
is treated as a partnership liquidation followed by a purchase of the assets distributed in
liquidation. The analysis differs because although the seller's side is straightforward - the
seller can be treated as selling a partnership interest because that is what he or she has and
the mere act of selling does not change the character of the interest-the buyer cannot be
treated as having bought a partnership interest because his purchase causes the entity to
cease being a partnership.
148. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-22-026 (Mar. 1, 2002).




tivity was providing insurance to X, the Service found that X had shifted
its risk but that the risk had not been distributed. 151 Thus, the arrange-
ment was not found to constitute insurance and Y was not treated as an
insurance company. 152
In the second situation, the only difference was that Y also provided
insurance to another unrelated entity. However, since that other insur-
ance accounted for only 10% of Y's business, the Service again found
insufficient risk distribution to allow the service provided by Y, to qualify
as insurance and thus, Y was not treated as an insurance company.1 53
The third situation was the same as the first, except that X conducted
its courier business through twelve separate LLCs of which X was the
only member.' 54 X had not made any election under the Check-the-Box
regulations, so the LLCs were disregarded entities.' 55 Again, the Service
found insufficient risk distribution because the two situations were identi-
cal for tax purposes, and again, Y was not treated as an insurance
company. 156
The fourth situation provides the coup de grace. That situation was the
same as the third except that each of the twelve LLCs had elected to be
treated as a corporation under the Check-the-Box regulations. 157 In that
situation, the Service found sufficient risk distribution because:
[t]he arrangements between Y and each LLC... shift a risk of loss
from each LLC to Y. The risks of the LLCs are distributed among
the various other LLCs that are insured under similar arrangements.
Therefore the arrangements between the 12 LLCs and Y constitute
insurance for federal income tax purposes.' 58
The effect of this conclusion was that Y was treated as an insurance
company for federal income tax purposes and the LLCs were able to de-
duct their payments to Y as insurance premiums. The Check-the-Box
election-an election that changed nothing about the substance of the
transaction and did not alter the distribution of risk in any meaningful
substantive manner-nevertheless changed the tax consequences dramat-
ically. Here, tax form mattered.
Despite having completely disregarded substance, the Service came to
the correct conclusion in Rev. Rul. 2005-40; having issued the Check-the-
Box regulations and created the disregarded entity, and having made the
characterization of the entity elective, the Service came to the only con-
clusion it could. For tax purposes, corporations are different from non-











corporate income tax.159 Therefore, it could be said that as a matter of
substance, an entity that is treated for tax purposes as a corporation is
different from a non-corporate entity. The problem is that in this case, as
in all cases where taxpayers elect corporate treatment under the Check-
the-Box regulations, the differences between corporations and non-cor-
porate entities are illusory for all purposes except the federal income tax.
Risk is not spread more widely in the fourth situation than in the third
because, as a substantive matter, the pool of risks in the two situations is
identical. 160 Only the making of an election that is effective for federal
tax purposes distinguishes the two situations by appearing, in the last situ-
ation, to lodge the risks with different legal persons. Nevertheless, form
appropriately trumps substance, as the rule of the Check-the-Box regula-
tions mandates.
In Revenue Ruling 2003-125,161 the Service also followed the linear
implications of the Check-the-Box regulations to conclude that a Check-
the-Box election allowed the sole owner of the entity to take a worthless
stock deduction. Revenue Ruling 2003-125 analyzed two situations in-
volving a foreign entity, all of whose interests were held by a U.S. corpo-
ration that checked the box to change its classification from a corporation
to a disregarded entity.162 In the first situation, the foreign entity was not
insolvent at the time of the elective change in classification even if the
determination of insolvency included intangibles, such as goodwill and
going concern value.163 In the second situation, the foreign entity was
insolvent at the time of the change if its intangibles were included in the
determination of solvency. 164 The Service explained that in an actual liq-
uidation §§ 331 and 332 could not apply if the shareholder received noth-
ing in exchange for its stock, and for that reason, a liquidation of an
159. See Moline Props. v. Comm'r, 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
160. See Rev. Rul. 2005-40, 2005-27 I.R.B. 1. I am not suggesting that the Service's
conclusion that in Situation 4 there is risk shifting and risk distribution is incorrect. In-
deed, the conclusion follows from the court's analysis in cases like Humana Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 881 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1980), and Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Commissioner, 62 F.3d
835 (6th Cir. 1995) and from the Service's current position with respect to captive insur-
ance companies. See Burgess J.W. Raby & William L. Raby, Captive Insurance-Some
Lights in the Fog, 97 TAX NoTEs 1711 (2002) (citing Rev. Proc. 2002-75, 2002-2 C.B. 997;
Rev. Rul. 2002-89, 2002-2 C.B. 984; Rev. Rul. 2002-90, 2002-2 C.B. 985; and Rev. Rul.
2002-91, 2002-2 C.B. 991). What is remarkable about the Service's conclusion is the extent
to which, appropriately, it respects the form of the transaction-the existence of a Check-
the-Box election. The temptation to be swayed by the substantive identity of Situations 3
and 4 must have been great, as the effects on the parent's balance sheet, assets, and net
worth are identical in the two situations. Nevertheless, the Service did precisely what I am
suggesting it should always do in situations like this: follow the Check-the-Box regulations
to their logical conclusion (no risk shifting and risk distribution in Situation 3) allowing the
taxpayer to make a different choice if it doesn't like that result (risk shifting and risk distri-
bution in Situation 4 following a Check-the-Box election).






insolvent corporation would not be subject to §§ 331 and 332,165 but
would instead produce a worthless security loss under § 165(g)(3)-on
the deemed liquidation the shareholder receives no payment for its stock.
Following the position set forth in the Check-the-Box regulations, the
Service treated the election not to be treated as a corporation, as an ac-
tual liquidation. Therefore, where the entity was insolvent, taking into
account the intangibles, the change in elective classification resulted in a
worthless security deduction under § 165(g)(3).
This ruling is notable because the Service treated a change in elective
classification as the occurrence of an actual transaction even though it
acknowledged that the change in elective classification had no effect on
the treatment of the entity under foreign law. 166 The Service did not
165. See REV. RUL. 59-296, 1959-2 C.B. 87 (holding that a liquidation of an insolvent
subsidiary into its parent, a bona fide creditor for cash advances that totaled more than the
fair market value of the subsidiary's assets, will neither be considered a nontaxable distri-
bution under § 332 nor a tax-free reorganization under § 368). See also Comm'r v. Spauld-
ing Bakeries, Inc., 252 F. 2d 693, 695-98 (2d Cir. 1958); H.K. Porter Co. v. Comm'r, 87 T.C.
689, 694-98 (1986) (each holding that § 332 or its predecessor will apply only to the extent
that a subsidiary's liquidating distribution was with respect to all of the subsidiary's stock,
so that a liquidating distribution made only to the preferred stock held by the parent, with
no distribution on the common stock held by the parent, indicates that the company was
insolvent at time of liquidation, and thus § 332 did not apply). The Treasury has proposed
to extend this net value requirement to other situations. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.332-2(b), 70
Fed. Reg. 11,903 (Mar. 10, 2005). The proposed regulations would require that there be an
exchange, or in the case of § 332, a distribution, of positive net value in order for §§ 351,
368, and 332 to apply. Id.
166. Before issuing Rev. Rul. 2003-125, the Service apparently struggled with the ques-
tion whether to apply doctrines that require it to give effect to transactions based on their
substance and came to contradictory conclusions. In one instance, it decided not to apply
those doctrines. In I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 2002-38-025 (June 14, 2002), the Ser-
vice analyzed the application of § 269(b) to a Check-the-Box election that resulted in a
deemed liquidation, thus suggesting that for purposes of applying tax avoidance doctrines
the Service would treat an election as it would treat the transaction that the election ef-
fects, so the election neither cleanses nor problematizes a transaction. I.R.S. Chief Couns.
Adv. 2002-38-025 (June 14, 2002). The Service also refused to "disregard [a company's]
check-the-box election and then reallocate to [that company], as a separate entity, the loss
recognized... on the sale of [its subsidiaries] stock." Id. The Service explained that it did
not believe it is appropriate to apply section 482 to disregard [the company's]
check-the-box election, given that entity classification for Federal income tax
purposes does not directly implicate the allocation of items of income be-
tween controlled taxpayers. It is not clear, therefore, that section 482 should
have application to these facts.
Id. However, in Field Service Advice ("FSA") 2002-26-004, issued by the Chief Counsel's
Income Tax and Accounting Division, the Service suggested that for purposes of determin-
ing whether there has been an identifiable event marking the worthlessness of a subsidi-
ary's stock, checking the box of an foreign entity, which should be treated as a liquidation
of the entity, does not have the same effect as actually liquidating the entity. I.R.S. Field
Serv. Adv. 2002-26-004 (June 28, 2002). The issuance of FSA 2002-26-004 did not end the
study of the matter, and the Treasury's officials continued to discuss the issue publicly. See
Sheryl Stratton, Treasury Officials Clarify Reach of Recent Corporate Guidance, 97 TAX
NoTEs 862 (2002). The issue also remained on the 2003 Business Plan. See I.R.S. Treasury
Release 2002-2003 Business Plan, TAX NoTEs TODAY, July 11, 2002, LEXIS, 2002 TNT
133-8; see also Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., The 2003-2004 Priority Guidance Plan for Chief
Counsel (Corporate), 100 TAX NoTEs 1443 (2003). The issuance of Rev. Rul. 2003-125,
which comes to a different conclusion than FSA 2002-26-004, shows that the rule-based
approach carried the day.
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identify any purpose, business or otherwise, for the transaction and noted
that the entity continued to operate as before even after the change. The
action that resulted in a deduction was not only taken at the election of
the taxpayer but was meaningful only for U.S. tax purposes. Giving ef-
fect to such an action is formalistic in the extreme, and while such formal-
ism follows directly from the approach of the Check-the-Box regulations,
it makes those instances in which the Service has refused to adhere to
that approach (such as in the bankruptcy-remote rulings discussed
above), all the more confounding. 167
D. THE CRYSTALS BEGIN TO TURN TO MUD.
Despite its adherence to form and the linear application of the Check-
the-Box rules in much of the public guidance it issued, the Service found
a transaction that exceeded its tolerance for the linear application of rules
in Dover Corp. v. Commissioner.1 68 Dover involved a second tier foreign
subsidiary of a U.S. corporation that requested, and obtained, permission
to file a retroactive election to check-the-box so that the foreign corpora-
tion would become a disregarded entity. The effect of this change in clas-
sification was that the foreign corporation was treated as having
liquidated into its parent in a § 332 liquidation, and the effect of the § 332
liquidation was to treat the parent as having conducted the business activ-
ities of the former subsidiary.169 The further effect of this in the interna-
tional context applicable to the transaction was to treat the owner of the
disregarded entity as being engaged in a trade or business so that its sale
of the assets of that business would not give rise to foreign personal hold-
ing company income ("FPHCI").1 70 By electing to treat the subsidiary as
a disregarded entity, the taxpayer avoided the application of the foreign
personal holding company provisions. The Tax Court, in an opinion writ-
ten by Judge Halpern, indicated that it recognized that the result it was
reaching was arguably inconsistent with the policies behind the foreign
personal holding company provisions, but laid the blame for that at the
167. See supra Section Ill(B).
168. 122 T.C. 324, 327-53 (2004).
169. Id. This conclusion followed from Rev. Rul. 75-223, 1975-1 C.B. 109. The Service
explained that:
Under section 381 ... a parent corporation that liquidates a subsidiary under
section 332 .. . inherits, among other attributes, the earnings and profits, net
operating loss carryovers, and accounting methods of the liquidated subsidi-
ary. These attributes pass to the parent corporation whether the liquidating
distribution consists of the operating assets of the subsidiary or the proceeds
of a sale of those assets. Section 381, in effect, integrates the past business
results of the subsidiary (as represented by its earnings and profits, net oper-
ating loss carryovers, etc.) with those of the parent corporation. [Thus], [for
most practical purposes, the parent corporation, after the liquidation of the
subsidiary, is viewed as if it had always operated the business of the liqui-
dated subsidiary.
Rev. Rul. 75-223, 1975-1 C.B. 109.
170. The FPHCI provisions were repealed by the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004,
but that repeal does not affect the proposition for which the case is discussed. American
Job Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (2004).
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Treasury's door, noting that the Treasury could amend the regulations to
require "a minimum period of continuous operation of a foreign disre-
garded entity's business, prior to the disposition of that business, as a
condition precedent to treating the owner as having been engaged in the
trade or business for purposes of characterizing the gain or loss.' 17 1 The
perceived abuse, according to Judge Halpern was "a problem of respon-
dent's own making. ' 172
Perhaps not surprisingly, in light of the apparent retreat from the for-
malistic approach represented by its litigating position in Dover, the Ser-
vice in PLR 2003-15-001173 retreated from a formalistic, linear application
of the Check-the-Box regulations. PLR 2003-15-001 involved a United
States parent corporation ("Old Parent") that inverted by merging into a
subsidiary of a newly formed corporation ("New Parent"), surviving and
then converting into an LLC. 174 Following the conversion, Old Parent
became a disregarded entity because it became an LLC whose sole owner
was New Parent. 175 The issue the Service was asked to rule on was the
effect of the transaction on debt issued by Old Parent. 176 After the inver-
sion and conversion, the debt was, as a matter of state law, still owed by
the same legal entity-Old Parent. 177 The problem was that for tax pur-
poses Old Parent was now a single member LLC and therefore did not
exist separately from the new entity-New Parent. If the LLC's separate
existence were disregarded for tax purposes, as the Check-the-Box regu-
lations command, then for tax purposes the debt would have to be treated
as owed by a different obligor-New Parent. As a result of Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1001-3(c)(1)(i) (part of the so-called Cottage Savings regulations), 178
which treats a change in obligor as a modification which triggers realiza-
tion of gain or loss, 1 7 9 applying the Check-the-Box regulations literally
171. Dover, 122 T.C. at 352.
172. Id. at 352-53 (quoting CSI Hydrostatic Testers, Inc. v. Comm'r, 103 T.C. 398, 411
(1994), affd. 62 F.3d 136 (5th Cir. 1995)). In a prescient but highly controversial move, the
Treasury had proposed regulations that would have invalidated Check-the-Box elections
made within a time frame that suggested a relationship to an "extraordinary transaction."
Those proposals were eventually withdrawn amid vociferous criticism that they under-
mined the elective nature of the Check-the-Box regulations. After all, what other reason
besides tax avoidance would any taxpayer have for making an election that is meaningful
only for tax purposes? For a description of the rise and demise of the proposed extraordi-
nary transaction regulations, see David L Click, Treasury Withdraws Extraordinary Check-
the-Box Regulations, 101 TAX NoTEs 95 (2003). For a pithy analysis of Dover and the
effect of the Check-the-Box Regulations, see Lee A. Sheppard, The Undead Subpart F, 103
TAX NoTEs 948 (2004). For an equally pithy retort, see Kimberly Blanchard, Sheppard's
Dover Discussion Dismantled, 103 TAx NoTEs 1297 (2004).





178. These regulations are referred to as the Cottage Savings regulations because they
were issued following the decision in Cottage Savings Ass'n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554
(1991), under which an arguably small change in the attributes of property nevertheless
resulted in realization.
179. Treas. Reg. §1.1001-3(b) provides that a "significant modification of a debt instru-
ment" will result "in an exchange of the original debt instrument for a modified instrument
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would cause the holders of Old Parent's debt to recognize income. 180
In PLR 2003-15-1001, the Service did not address the issue of the appli-
cation of the Check-the-Box regulations directly. Instead, it observed
that:
[T]he conversion of [Old Parent] into [LLC] will not affect the legal
rights or obligations between the Debt holders and [Old Parent], be-
cause, as a matter of State law, [LLC] will remain the same legal
entity as [Old Parent]. The Debt holders will continue to have ex-
actly the same legal relationship with [LLCI that they previously had
with [Old Parent], viz., as general unsecured recourse claimants hav-
ing no greater preference than any other creditor.18 1
The Service then concluded that the change in nominal obligor was not a
modification under the Cottage Savings regulations, so the restructuring
did not result in the recognition of gain.
As a matter of substance, the Service's conclusion in PLR 2003-15-1001
is clearly correct. There is no reason to cause realization of gain or loss
when the legal obligor remains the same, because as a matter of sub-
stance, nothing has changed. In the situation described in the ruling, Old
Parent continued to exist and retained its obligation to the debt holders-
only its legal form changed. Nevertheless, the problem is that for tax
purposes, Old Parent, the original legal obligor, ceased to exist. Under
the Check-the-Box regulations a disregarded entity does not exist for fed-
eral tax purposes. There is no reasonable construction of those regula-
tions that would allow the Service to resurrect the disregarded entity for
purposes of applying the Cottage Savings regulations. When for tax pur-
poses Old Parent ceased to exist, New Parent became the obligor. A
change in obligor therefore occurred and application of the Cottage Sav-
ings regulations would result in gain recognition to the debt holders.1 82
that differs materially in either kind or extent." Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-3(b) (1996). Such an
exchange is a realization event, resulting in gain or loss to the debt holder. If the modifica-
tion is not "significant," then there is no exchange. Treas. Reg. §1.1001-3(c) defines "modi-
fication," and Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-3(e)-(f) define "significant modification." Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1001-3(c)-(f).
180. In describing the facts the Service observed that "[t]he current trading price of one
or more series of the Debt is substantially less than its respective adjusted issue prices."
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2003-15-001 (Sept. 19, 2002). Therefore, as Jack Cummings observed:
the reason Parent wanted the ruling may have been that if the debt securities were treated
as exchanged in a § 1001 sale or exchange, and the "new" securities were treated as having
an issue price less than the adjusted issue price of the old securities, then the corporate
debtor would have to recognize cancellation of indebtedness income. See BORIS I. BITrKER
& JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATION AND SHAREHOLD-
ERS & 12.27[4][c] (7th ed. 2005); Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., The Disregarded Entity Is and
Isn't (Disregarded), 99 TAX NOTES 743, 744 (2003). The Cottage Savings regulations con-
tain an exception for new obligors that become so as a result of § 381 transactions or asset
acquisitions. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-3(e)(4)(i)(B), (C); Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-3(g) (Example
7). Nevertheless, although the Service noted the existence of exceptions, apparently none
applied to the facts in the ruling.
181. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2003-15-001.
182. This result follows so long as none of the exceptions in Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-3(e)(4)
applies, as apparently they did not in this case. See supra note 180.
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It is hard to fault the Service for reaching a result that is both substan-
tively correct and favorable to taxpayers, particularly when that result is
economically efficient because it removes tax as an impediment to corpo-
rate transactions. Nevertheless, the Service only confuses the law and
turns crystals into mud when it ignores the implications of its own regula-
tions.183 The conclusion the Service reached in this situation is the
equivalent of saying "we will ignore the separate existence of a disre-
garded entity for federal tax purposes, except when ignoring that separate
existence would reach a substantively incorrect result." The problem
with this view is that disregarding the separate existence of an entity
which not only exists under state law but which was almost certainly cre-
ated because it had a separate existence and thus afforded its owner lim-
ited liability, is itself counter-substantive. Given that the single owner of
the LLC can choose the tax classification of the entity, it is not unreason-
able to follow the logical consequence of that choice. If the single owner
does not like the consequences of its choice, it can elect corporate sta-
tus. 184 The Check-the-Box regulations can achieve their objective of re-
ducing entity classification questions only if they are consistently applied.
Because classification is elective, any unfavorable consequence that might
result from the consistent application of that classification is of the tax-
payer's own making and can be altered by taxpayer action.
Proposed regulations dealing with allocation of partnership debt show
that the Service has not completely retreated from the rule based ap-
proach of the Check-the-Box regulations. 185 These proposed regulations
address the difficult, and almost certainly unforeseen, questions that arise
when a disregarded entity is a partner in a partnership and it is necessary
to determine the extent of each partner's liability for partnership debt
that is recourse to the partnership. Mechanical application of the Check-
the-Box regulations requires that the separate existence of the LLC be
ignored and that the LLC's owner be treated as the partner. The prob-
183. This ruling has prompted sophisticated practitioner commentary that reveals the
confusion its conclusion created. See Cummings, supra note 180. For further discussion of
issues related to ownership of debt by disregarded entities, see Terence F. Cuff, Indebted-
ness of a Disregarded Entity, 81 TAXES 303 (2003) (noting that debt owned by a disre-
garded entity is treated as non-recourse to the entity's owner). See also Marc D.
Teitelbaum, A Disregarded Entity Must Be Taken Into Account, 97 TAX NorEs 1205 (2002).
For an analysis of the likely consequences of the acquisition of target debt by a disregarded
entity that is the survivor in a tax-free merger, see Elizabeth T. Kessenides & Alison S.
Wang, Taxation of Debtholders in LLC Mergers, TAX NoTEs TODAY, Sept. 28, 2004,
LEXIS, 2004 TNT 188-35.
184. If Old Parent had elected corporate status after converting into an LLC, the trans-
actions would have been an "F" reorganization and the nominal change in obligor would
not have triggered realization of gain under the Cottage Savings regulations. See Cum-
mings, supra note 180, at 743 (noting that "[i]f debt securities of a corporation are ex-
changed for new debt securities of the corporation, the creditors can enjoy an exception to
recognition by virtue of a recapitalization/reorganization, and generally will recognize gain
only if the principal amount increases," but also warning that a recapitalization can cause
cancellation of indebtedness income to the corporation if the principal amount of the loan
drops).
185. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(a), 69 Fed. Reg. 49,832-01 (Aug. 4, 2004).
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lem that causes is that the LLC's owner is not legally liable for partner-
ship debts because of the limited liability afforded by the LLC.
Therefore, treating partnership level debt as recourse to the single owner,
the partner, would misrepresent the nature of the legal relationships. 186
The Service struggled with the dilemma presented by this situation and
debated various approaches, including treating the debt as nonrecourse
to a disregarded entity general partner, 187 and characterizing the debt
based on the level of economic risk to which the owner of the disregarded
entity was subject.' 88 The Proposed Regulations follow that approach.
They provide that partnership liabilities will be treated as recourse to the
extent that the partner bears the economic risk of loss. 189 Under the pro-
posed regulations, a partner will be treated as bearing the economic risk
of loss only to the extent of the net value of the disregarded entity, unless
the owner of the disregarded entity is otherwise required to satisfy the
obligations of the disregarded entity.190
The proposed regulations adopt precisely the right approach.' 9' They
186. A similar problem used to arise under the Kintner regulations when limited part-
nerships have a general partner that is a corporation. See supra note 74.
187. See Treasury Official Offers Insight into Business Plan Partnership Items, TAX
NoTEs TODAY, Sept. 17, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 180-4. In addition to simply treating the
debt as nonrecourse, the Service considered allocating the debt to the general partner or
treating the debt as a pledge of the LLC's assets. Id.
188. In April, 2004, the American Bar Association Section of Taxation ("ABA Tax Sec-
tion") submitted members' comments considering the issues that arise in applying the
§ 752 regulations when partnership debt is recourse to a general partner but the general
partner is an LLC that is a disregarded entity. Richard Shaw, ABA Comments on Regs on
Characterization of Partnership Liabilities, TAX NoTEs TODAY, Apr. 27, 2004, LEXIS, 2004
TNT 81-21. The ABA Tax Section recommended that partnership debt be characterized
based on the economic risk of loss to which the owner of the disregarded entity is subject
and provided a number of examples applying its proposed paradigm. Id.
189. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(a), 69 Fed. Reg. 49,832-01. In the first update to its
2005-2006 Priority Guidance Plan, the Treasury announced that it plans to finalize these
proposed regulations in 2006. Press Release, Dept. of the Treas., First Periodic Update of
the 2005-2006 Priority Avoidance Plan (Mar. 6, 2006), available at http://www.treas.gov/
press/releases/js4095.htm.
190. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2, 69 Fed. Reg. 49,832-01. The proposed regulations con-
tain a definition of net value that is based on fair market value, excluding the disregarded
entity's interest in the partnership. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(k)(2), 69 Fed. Reg. at
49,835. Unless certain triggering events occur, the assets of the disregarded entity will not
be revalued, but the Service is considering, and has requested comments on, the question
whether the partner should be able to make an election to revalue the disregarded entity's
assets even in the absence of a triggering event. It has also sought comments on whether
the list of triggering events ought to be expanded. See IRS Publishes Proposed Regs on
Treatment of Disregarded Entities, TAX NoTEs TODAY, Aug. 12, 2004, LEXIS, 2004 TNT
156-6.
191. Although the ABA Tax Section has generally commended the Treasury on the
positions taken in the proposed regulations, the AICPA has urged that the proposed regu-
lations not be adopted. Compare Kenneth W. Gideon, ABA Members Comment on Pro-
posed Regs on Disregarded Entities, TAX NoTEs TODAY, Apr. 7, 2005, LEXIS, 2005 TNT
66-27 with Thomas J. Purcell, AICPA Seeks Withdrawal of Proposed Regs on Disregarded
Entities, TAX NoTEs TODAY, Feb. 1, 2006, LEXIS, 2006 TNT 21-10. For a thoughtful cri-
tique of the proposed regulations which the authors characterize as theoretically pure but
imposing significant compliance burdens on taxpayers, see Blake D. Rubin & Andrea Mc-
intosh Whiteway, Disregarded Entities and Partnership Liability Allocations: Proposed
Regs Critiqued, 106 TAX NoTEs 321 (2005).
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disregard the separate existence of the entity and focus on the economic
risk of loss faced by the owner. The key is that the proposed regulations
do not treat the LLC as the partner, nor do they treat the debt as being
the debt of the LLC. Rather, they look through the LLC to its owner and
determine the extent of the owner's economic risk of repayment. To the
extent that the owner is at risk, based on the property of the LLC (which
is treated as the owner's property), then the debt will be treated as re-
course to the owner. The separate existence of the LLC is disregarded, as
it should be under the rule adopted in the Check-the-Box regulation.
E. THE NEED FOR MORE GUIDANCE
The need for guidance on issues involving disregarded entities shows
no sign of abating. Two issues which have already received attention
from commentators are worth mentioning.
1. Cancellation of Debt
One currently unresolved issue is how § 108 should be applied to debt
discharged to a disregarded entity. Some solvent corporations are appar-
ently taking the position that § 108(a) applies to the cancellation of in-
debtedness income of LLCs in which they are the single member. 192 This
position is derived from Tax Court Memorandum decisions in which gen-
eral partners in partnerships which filed for bankruptcy were granted dis-
charges in bankruptcy. 193 The taxpayer's argument would be that
although the taxpayer-the corporate owner of the LLC-has not itself
been discharged in bankruptcy, the debts discharged in bankruptcy are,
for federal tax purposes, its debts (the debts of the taxpayer/owner) be-
cause for federal tax purposes the LLC does not exist as a separate entity.
Furthermore, the taxpayer/owner is the only person who could be treated
as being before the bankruptcy court, as required by § 108(d)(2), because
for federal tax purposes the LLC does not exist as a separate entity.
192. Sheryl Stratton, Officials Highlight Upcoming Consolidated, Corporate Guidance,
TAX NoTEs TODAY, Sept. 22, 2004, LEXIS, 2004 TNT 184-3.
193. See, e.g., Price v. Comm'r, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1426 (2004); Garcia v. Comm'r, 87
T.C.M. (CCH) 1423 (2004); Mirarchi v. Comm'r, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1424 (2004); Martinez
v. Comm'r, T.C.M. (CCH) 1428 (2004). The Service has stated that it is working on "gui-
dance that would make this position disclosable." Stratton, supra note 192. Apparently,
some taxpayers are taking the position that if a partner in a partnership can use the
§ 108(a)(1)(A) exclusion when the partnership files for bankruptcy, as the Tax Court al-
lowed in Price and similar cases, the single-member of a bankrupt LLC should be able to
do likewise.
Section 108(a)(1)(A) provides an exclusion for amounts discharged in a "Title 11 case."
Section 108(d)(2) provides that a "Title 11 case" means a case under Title 11 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code, "but only if the taxpayer is under the jurisdiction of the court in such
case and the discharge of indebtedness is granted by the court or is pursuant to a plan
approved by the court." Price, 87 T.C.M., at 1406. In Price, the opinion of the bankruptcy
court explicitly asserted jurisdiction over the general partner, who had also personally
guaranteed the partnership's debt, and the partner agreed to contribute additional
amounts to the partnership in exchange for the discharge. Id. It is the Service's position
that it does not follow from cases like Price that a single-member LLC whose debts are
discharged in bankruptcy is eligible for the benefits of § 108(a).
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Such a position should not be sustained. The LLC is not a taxpayer
under the Code, and if it is the only entity under the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court then the requirements for purposes of § 108(d)(2) have
not been met. In the Tax Court Memorandum decisions that raise this
issue the bankruptcy court asserted jurisdiction over the partner as well
as the partnership. If, as in those decisions, the single member owner has
personally guaranteed the LLC's debts (as business exigencies might dic-
tate), and if the bankruptcy court asserts jurisdiction over the single mem-
ber owner, then the taxpayer's argument could succeed, but not
otherwise.194
It has also been suggested that the insolvency exception of
§ 108(a)(1)(B) should apply to discharge of indebtedness income of a sin-
gle member LLC that is insolvent at the time of the discharge, regardless
of whether or not its single owner is insolvent. 195 That should not occur.
To test the application of § 108(a)(1)(B) at the LLC level contravenes the
explicit directive of the Check-the-Box regulations to disregard the exis-
tence of the LLC for federal tax purposes. Nevertheless, proponents of
this result note that, substantively, testing the solvency of the LLC rather
than its single owner best comports with the policies behind § 108. They
argue that because the Service has been willing to ignore the Check-the-
Box regulations and apply the tax law as if the LLC, and not its single
owner, were the taxpayer in other situations, it should do so in this situa-
tion as well. 196
That such arguments are being made underscores the need for the Ser-
vice's consistent application of the rule-based approach of the Check-the-
Box regulations and proves that the clear, administrable world the Trea-
sury tried to create when it promulgated those regulations is in imminent
danger of unraveling. 197 A taxpayer should not be able to have it both
ways. Having elected to disregard the separate existence of the LLC, the
194. This should be true even though § 108(d)(6), which provides that § 108(a) will ap-
ply at the partner level, does not apply to a single-member LLC. I.R.C. § 108(d)(7) (2005).
Arguably, no provision like § 108(d)(6) is necessary in the case of a single-member LLC,
because the Check-the-Box regulations ignore the existence of the entity and treat the
owner as the taxpayer, so § 108 could only apply at the owner level.
195. Stephanie R. Hoffer, Give Them My Regards: A Proposal For Applying The COD
Rules To Disregarded Entities, 107 TAX NoTEs 327 (2005).
196. Id. at 330.
197. Id. at 330-33. Ms. Hoffer not only proposed that § 108 apply at the LLC level, but
supported her argument by pointing out that the Service itself has regarded disregarded
entities when "state property laws or basic tax principles require it." Id. at 333. As she
explained in introducing her proposal:
To support its proposal, this article first examines the section's treatment of
partnerships and S corporations, comparing those entities to disregarded en-
tities. Next, the article discusses the tax evolution of disregarded entities,
focusing primarily on instances in which the IRS has respected them as sepa-
rate from their owners. The article then explores the difficulty of applying
current section 108 to bankrupt or insolvent disregarded entities and finally
concludes that all state law entities possessing distinct property rights should
be respected as such when assessing the tax results of forgiveness of indebt-




taxpayer should suffer all of the consequences of that decision, not just
those that are favorable. 198 If the taxpayer wants to have § 108 apply at
the entity level, it can easily change its elections. If the taxpayer is willing
to suffer the tax consequences of such revocation, should it be entitled to
have the separate existence of the entity respected for tax purposes.
2. Administrative Dissolution
Another area in need of clarification is the effect of the administrative
dissolution of a corporation. The problem arises when a corporation fails
to comply, usually inadvertently, with a state-imposed requirement, and
under state law that failure results in the involuntary dissolution of the
corporation. 199 In most of the cases that have come before the Service,
when the fact of dissolution is discovered the corporation takes the neces-
sary steps to be reinstated as such under state law. Under the laws of
some, but not all, states, the reinstatement relates back to the initial dis-
solution. If the administrative dissolution causes the corporation to cease
to be a corporation under state law, strict application of the Check-the-
Box regulations would cause the dissolution to be treated as a liquidation
for tax purposes, after which the entity will be treated as a disregarded
entity if it has only one owner, or as a partnership if it has multiple own-
ers.200 If the state law problem is subsequently cured and corporate sta-
tus under state law is restored, the Check-the-Box regulations would treat
that restoration as an incorporation transaction to which § 351 or the liq-
Ms. Hoffer used Dover v. Comm'r, 122 T.C. 324 (2004) and I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2003-
15-001 (Sept. 19, 2002) as I do, but she also pointed to Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(a), 69
Fed. Reg. 49,832-01 (Aug. 12, 2004) as an example of the government's regarding disre-
garded entities. As explained above, I disagree with that assessment of those proposed
regulations. See supra notes 181-91 and accompanying text.
198. Ms. Hoffer argued that:
Failing to apply section 108 to disregarded entities at the entity level results in
federal tax distortion of the state law business arrangement as well as a po-
tential reduction in government revenue. These are problems the code
should avoid in the interests of federalism, equity, and taxpayer ease of use.
Failing to regard a disregarded entity in debt situations fails to respect the
state law rights of the entity and is an approach that should be rejected.
Id. at 338. I disagree because disregarding single-member LLCs as entities separate from
their owners itself provides a significant "distortion of state law business arrangement[s] as
well as a potential reduction in government revenue." Id. Yet, that is what the Treasury
and the IRS chose to do in promulgating the Check-the-Box regulations. I see no reason
to depart from that approach when the entity's debt, which was treated as the owner's debt
for tax purposes, presumably entitling the owner to interest deductions, is forgiven. I am
simply calling for consistency.
199. See John E. Bragonje, The Rise and Fall of the Check-the-Box Regime: A Solution
to Recent Private Letter Rulings' Troubling Use of the De Facto Corporation Doctrine, TAX
NoTEs TODAY, May 6, 2005, LEXIS, 2005 TNT 87-45.
200. Although the Check-the-Box regulations would permit such an entity to elect cor-
porate status, that is not meaningful in these cases. By hypothesis, these are cases in which
no one connected with the entity knows that the entity has been administratively dissolved
under state law, so there is no one to make a Check-the-Box election. Furthermore, al-
though the rescission doctrine would allow a taxpayer to ignore the dissolution if it was
discovered in the same year it occurred, in many of the cases that have caused examination
of the issue, the dissolution was not discovered until after the year in which it occurred.
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uidation reincorporation doctrine could apply.20 1 Both the liquidation
and the reincorporation could result in the recognition of gain or loss.
The Service has not so analyzed these situations. Instead, when asked
to rule on the tax consequences of administrative dissolutions the Service
has merely noted that the determination of whether an organization is
taxed as a corporation is a matter of federal law and that if the affairs of
the corporation continue after the termination of its existence, the organi-
zation becomes an association taxable as a corporation.20 2 Although the
Service is correct in its apparent conclusion that administrative dissolu-
tion should not be treated as a liquidation, it has confused the application
of the Check-the-Box regulations by not setting forth an analysis that is
consistent with the application of those regulations.
Instead of ignoring the existence of the Check-the-Box regulations, the
Service could, for example, allow the entities to make retroactive elec-
tions to be treated as corporations during the time of dissolution.20 3 Al-
ternatively, Treasury and the Service could amend the Check-the-Box
regulations to provide that administrative dissolution will not alter the
status of the entity as one incorporated under state law for federal tax
purposes, or the Service might even issue a Ruling publicly announcing
such an interpretation of the term "corporation" in the Check-the-Box
regulations. The point is that the Service should consistently apply the
Check-the-Box regulations and not just ignore them when such applica-
tion is inconvenient or reaches a substantively unwarranted result. If ap-
plication of the regulations is not warranted, the Service should so state
and then should create an appropriate exception. Doing otherwise only
creates confusion and leaves taxpayers to wonder whether the regulations
will apply in any given case.
Otherwise, if this were an area of the tax law where substance mat-
tered, perhaps I would feel differently. But in the area of entity classifica-
tion, substance no longer matters.2°4 The Treasury decided that when it
issued the Check-the-Box regulations and made classification elective.
201. See BITrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 180, 12.64; Richard W. Bailine, The Eluci-
dation of the Liquidation-Reincorporation Doctrine, 30 J. CORP. TAX'N 34 (2003). The cur-
rent corporate priority guidance plan includes promulgating regulations concerning the
liquidation-reincorporation doctrine in the context of section 336(e), See Jasper L. Cum-
mings, Treasury's 2005-2006 Corporate Priority Guidance Plan, 108 TAX NoTEs 1195
(2005). See OFFICE OF TAx POLICY AND INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE: 2005-2006 PRIOR-
ITY GUIDANCE PLAN, available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/20052006%
20gpllst%20updaterevisedl.pdf.
202. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-14-029 (Jan. 8, 2001); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-23-
058 (Mar. 13, 2001); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-52-033 (Aug. 27, 2003); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
2003-15-20 (Jan. 6, 2003); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-35-017 (May 26, 2005); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 2005-39-005 (June 17, 2005).
203. This solution is suggested by Bragonje, supra note 199. Under this analysis,
neither the dissolution nor the reinstatement would have any tax consequences because,
even if the state law corporation and the elected corporation were seen as different, the
conversion from one into the other would qualify as an "F" reorganization, resulting in no
gain or loss at either the corporate or shareholder levels.




Having struck a blow for administrability in so doing, it should not squan-
der the gains it made by letting substance creep back into the analysis.
While creating an exception to the application of the Check-the-Box
regulations in the case of administrative dissolution might be construed as
surrendering to the lure of substance and muddying the rules, that need
not be the result. Mud results when the edges of the rules become un-
clear. However, what I am suggesting here is creating a more complex
rule, not converting a rule into a standard.20 5 The creation of a more
complex rule to deal with administrative dissolution casts a blow for ad-
ministrability, removing the uncertainty that now exists and the need for
the Service to issue a multitude of PLRs permitting retroactive elections.
It is entirely consistent with the rationale behind the issuance of the
Check-the-Box regulations.
F. PAYMENT AND COLLECTIONS-THE PLACE FOR A STANDARD
Using a rule to determine the tax consequences of transactions involv-
ing disregarded entities ensures that the Check-the-Box regulations ac-
complish their objective of providing certainty in an area of the tax law
that affects many taxpayers. Because the classification is elective, taxpay-
ers can avoid any consequences they do not want by changing their elec-
tive classification. 20 6 Consistent application of the default rule established
by the Check-the-Box regulations will ensure that the goal of increased
administrability in this area is achieved.
But one rule does not fit all circumstances. Consistently disregarding
the separate existence of the entity for federal tax purposes is feasible
because only federal tax law is involved in the determination of federal
tax liability. Therefore, federal tax law can choose to ignore the sub-
stance of state law attributes if doing so promotes a higher goal, such as,
in this case, certainty and predictability in the administration of the tax
laws. However, when it comes to collecting the amount of tax due, fed-
eral law cannot override state law.20 7 Therefore, in matters of assess-
ment, collection, and payment a standard should apply.
The Check-the-Box regulations were designed to allow taxpayers to
elect pass-through taxation regardless of the attributes of their non-cor-
porate entity, and to provide certainty in that determination regardless of
205. As Louis Kaplow has pointed out, rules need not be either simple or simplistic.
Kaplow, supra note 12, at 565-66. Constitutive rules, which themselves create a regime,
like the rules of games and the rule adopted in the Check-the-Box regulations, are particu-
larly apt subjects for complexity, particularly if the complexity breeds clarity and adminis-
tratiblity. See SCHAUER, supra note 12, at 6-7.
206. The taxpayer's power to change elective classification is not unlimited, as the regu-
lations require consent for any change within five years of a previous change. Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-3(c)(1)(iv) prohibits an entity from changing its classification within sixty
months of the initial effective date, unless it obtains permission from the IRS. Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-3(c)(1)(iv) (as amended in 2005). In practice, taxpayers have found this to be a
relatively easy hurdle to overcome, but that is a topic beyond the scope of this piece.




the specific attributes of the entity. Nothing in those objectives suggests
that the government's ability to collect the tax due should be constrained.
The certainty taxpayers expect can be provided by a rule that allows tax-
payers to determine the tax consequences of transactions ex ante. Those
are the situations in which taxpayers are most likely to seek legal advice
before choosing a course of action and in which the promulgation of rules
is most efficient.20 8
Ex post determinations involve different considerations and should be
made by using a standard to determine who is the legal owner of the
property that gave rise to the tax liabilities in question. The goal of ad-
ministrability is not hampered by the government's application of a stan-
dard in this context. Not only are these not situations in which taxpayers
tend to seek legal advice before acting, but allowing the government to
enforce payment from whoever has legal control over the assets that gave
rise to the liability-even if the person who controls the assets is not the
same as the person who is the taxpayer for purposes of determining the
tax consequences of transactions-simply ensures that all taxpayers are
treated equitably by allowing enforcement of tax liabilities attributable to
their activities.
In matters of collection, there is no need to disregard the separate exis-
tence of the entity. For years, the Service has struggled with the problems
that arise when assets are owned by a legal entity that for tax purposes
did not exist and was therefore not the taxpayer whose assets could be
levied or seized. Although disregarding the separate existence of the en-
tity has allowed the Service to collect from the single owner,20 9 by not
treating the entity as the taxpayer the Service loses the ability to collect
from the entity itself. As the Service has explained in Chief Counsel
Advice:
In Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49 (1999), the Supreme Court ar-
ticulated a two-prong test to determine a taxpayer's property and
rights to property .... First, a taxpayer's interests or rights must be
determined under state law. Second, one must determine whether
such interests or rights are property or rights to property under the
Internal Revenue Code. If under the first prong, a taxpayer has no
interest in or rights to particular property under state law, it follows
that the IRS has no right to levy the particular property under the
Internal Revenue Code.
Under the first prong of the Drye test, one looks to state law to de-
termine a taxpayer's interest. Under state law, the taxpayer/single
member owner has no interest in the LLC's property. Thus, as a gen-
eral rule, even though an LLC is disregarded as an entity separate
from the single member owner, and its activities are treated in the
208. Kaplow, supra note 12, at 568-579.
209. Indeed, this was the situation that led to the challenge to the validity of the regula-
tions. See Littriello v. United States, No. 3:04CV143H, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9813 (W.D.
Ky. May 18, 2005). The Service's litigating position in Littriello was consistent with that
which it had previously taken in Chief Counsel Advice. See I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv.
Mem. 1999-22-053 (June 15, 1999).
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same manner as a sole proprietorship, branch, or division of its single
member owner, for federal tax liability purposes, the IRS cannot sat-
isfy the single member owner's tax liability from the disregarded
LLC's assets.210
Although concluding that it could not levy against the assets of the LLC
directly did not leave the Service without remedy,211 it unquestionably
hampered collection efforts. The problems included determining who
should receive a collection due process notice,212 whether assessment no-
tices issued in the name of the LLC were valid,213 whether single member
210. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 2003-38-012 (Sept. 19, 2003), reprinted in LLC Not
"Other Person" for Employment Tax Purposes, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 24, 2003, LEXIS,
2003 TNT 185-19. Prior Chief Counsel Advice was to the same effect; in CCA 1999-30-
013, Kathryn Zuba, the Chief of Branch 2 (General Litigation), concluded that although a
single-member LLC is a disregarded entity for federal tax purposes, it is an entity separate
from its owner for state law purposes, and that the Service cannot collect from the LLC's
property in order to satisfy the single owner's federal tax liability. I.R.S. Chief Couns.
Adv. Mem. 1999-30-013 (July 30, 1999). Ms. Zuba reached this conclusion by reasoning
that §§ 6321 and 6331 only permit collection from the property of the person liable for the
tax and that the person liable for the tax was the individual owner, who does not own the
property of the LLC under state law. Id. She concluded that:
[W]e do not believe that it is inconsistent to disregard an LLC entity for
purposes of determining federal tax liability, but to recognize the LLC as a
valid entity for determining what property the taxpayer has an ownership
interest in under state law. This result follows from the general principal [sic]
that state law determines what property a taxpayer has an interest in for
purposes of tax collection.
Id. See also Memorandum for Associate Area Counsel, SB/SE:2 (Washington, DC), TAX
NOTES TODAY, Sept. 3, 2002, LEXIS, 2002 TNT 170-19 (bearing a June 28, 2002 date but
released on August 30, 2002).
211. As Zuba explained in CCA 1999-30-013, the Service could levy on the LLC to
reach distributions due to the owner, which is property of the owner under state law.
I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 199-22-053 (July 15, 1999). In addition, the Service could
"file alter ego liens in reliance on state law principles permitting a creditor to disregard a
business entity" under the concept of piercing the corporate veil. Id. The CCA noted that
at least one court has applied corporate piercing principles to LLCs, (Hollowell v. Orleans
Regional Hospital, No. 95-4029, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8184 (E.D. La. May 29, 1998)), and
cites Eric Fox, Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability Companies, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1143 (1994) for a discussion of when courts will allow piercing. Id. In general, piercing
principles apply to LLCs. Michael G. Schinner, IRS Rulings Expand Opportunities for
Using Single-Member LLCs in 1031 Exchanges, J. TAX'N 286, 292-93 (1998) (citing Cox
and Woods, Piercing the Veil in Limited Liability Companies, 4 J. LIMITED LIABILITY COS.
83 (1997)). See also I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 2002-16-028 (Mar. 20, 2002), (discuss-
ing the alter ego, or "piercing the corporate veil" argument and the difficulties of applying
it, but also explores other possibilities, such as asserting nominee or transferee liability).
212. In CCA 2002-16-028, Mitchel S. Hyman, Senior Technical Reviewer for Branch 1,
concluded that when the Service makes an assessment against a single-member LLC it
should issue a separate collection due process ("CDP") notice to the owner even if the
owner received the LLC's CDP notice, and thus had actual notice of the assessment be-
cause "[it]s approach ensures that a single-member owner will receive the CDP safeguards
that Congress enacted." I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 2002-16-028 (Mar. 20, 2002). For
analysis and commentary on this Chief Counsel Advice, see Nicholas J. Fiore, Single-Mem-
ber Owners of Disregarded LLCs Should Receive Separate Due Process Notices, 7 THE TAX
ADVISER 476 (2002).
213. In FSA 2001-14-006 and FSA 2001-05-045, two Assistant Chief Counsels con-
cluded that assessments in the name and taxpayer identification number of a single-mem-
ber LLC were valid when the employment tax returns were filed with the address of the
sole owner as the address for the LLC, and that, even if the assessments were technically
erroneous because not issued in the name of the sole owner, the sole owner was neither
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LLCs should report and pay employment taxes under the name and tax-
payer identification number of the LLC or of the owner,2 14 and whether
any changes in name or taxpayer identification number needed to be
made when a disregarded entity acquired additional owners and became
a partnership, or vice versa.2 15 In most of its struggle over collections, the
Service assumed that it would be bound by its decision to disregard the
separate existence of the entity. The exception was Notice 99-6, where, in
providing a choice with respect to employment taxes, the Service seemed
to acknowledge the difficulties posed by the dual nature of such entities,
which exist as separate entities for state law purposes such as opening
bank accounts and depositing and paying state taxes. 216
Eventually, the Treasury issued proposed regulations providing that a
disregarded entity could be separately liable for federal taxes and would
be subject to assessment, lien, and levy, and entitled to refunds or credits,
when the liability arose from a time when the entity was not disre-
garded.2 17 Although treating disregarded entities as separate entities in
such circumstances could be justified as an application of a relation-back
doctrine, the proposed regulations nevertheless departed from the lan-
prejudiced nor misled by the error so that the assessments would still be valid against the
sole owner. I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-14-006 (Apr. 2001); I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv.
Mem. 2001-05-045 (Feb. 2, 2001). The FSAs relied on several cases in which courts had
found that technical errors that did not deprive the taxpayers of notice would not operate
to invalidate the assessments. One such case was Marvel v. United States, 719 F.2d 1507
(10th Cir. 1983), where the court upheld assessments made in the trade name of an unin-
corporated business rather than in the names of the individual owners of the business.
214. I.R.S. Notice 99-6, 1999-1 C.B. 321. See infra note 216.
215. In Rev. Rul. 2001-61, the Service ruled that if a disregarded entity that chose to
calculate, report and pay its employment tax obligations under its own name and taxpayer
identification number, as permitted by Notice 99-6, acquires additional owners and thus
becomes a partnership as provided by Rev. Rul. 99-6, it must continue to use that taxpayer
identification number to so report. Rev. Rul. 2001-61, 2001-2 C.B. 573. In Rev. Rul. 2001-
61, the Service also ruled that if a partnership becomes a disregarded entity because it
retains only one former partner, as provided by Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(f)(2) and Rev.
Rul. 99-6, and if the disregarded entity has chosen to calculate, report and pay its employ-
ment tax obligations under its own name and taxpayer identification number, as permitted
by Notice 99-6, the disregarded entity must continue to use the partnership's taxpayer
identification number. Id. Nevertheless, the Service made it clear that for all other federal
tax purposes, the disregarded entity must use the taxpayer identification number of its
owner pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 301.6109-1(h)(2)(i). Id.
216. In Notice 99-6, the Service announced that it would accept calculation, reporting
and payment of employment taxes with respect to employees of disregarded entities made
in either in the name and taxpayer identification number of the owner, or under the name
and taxpayer identification number of the entity. I.R.S. Notice 99-6, 1999-1 C. B. 321. The
Service explained that if a taxpayer chose the second method, the owner of the disregarded
entity would retain ultimate responsibility for the employment tax obligations and that it
would respect that method even if the timing or amount of payments differed from what
would have been the result if the first method had been chosen. Id. Notice 99-6 has been
criticized as failing to include qualified subsidiaries of exempt title holding corporations or
trusts, as defined in § 501(c)(25)(E)(i), and for not specifically preserving the ability of
those types of subsidiaries to obtain separate taxpayer identification numbers when neces-
sary for state law purposes. Emily W. Mao, Attorney Notes Omission in Notice on Report-
ing and Payment by Disregarded Entities, 83 TAx NoTEs 831 (1999).
217. I.R.S., IRS Clarifies Treatment of Disregarded Entities as Separate from Owners,
TAX NoTEs TODAY, Apr. 5, 2004, LEXIS, 2004 TNT 65-70.
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guage of the Check-the-Box regulations.218 The speed with which those
proposed regulations were finalized, 219 and the issuance of another set of
proposed regulations in the same year that also recognized the separate
existence of single member LLCs for purposes of payment of employ-
ment and excise taxes,220 suggest that the Treasury might be having a
change of heart with respect to the breadth of the rule it announced in
the Check-the-Box regulations in the case of assessment, collection, and
payment. 221
The Treasury should have just such a change of heart, and it should
announce that change by amending the Check-the-Box regulations. The
Treasury should amend the Check-the-Box regulations to limit the appli-
cation of the rule it announced there to ex ante determinations of the
consequences of transactions. It should further announce that for pur-
poses of assessment, collection, and payment of tax liabilities pertaining
to the property or transactions undertaken by the LLC, the separate
identity of the LLC will be respected when that is necessary to permit
proper administration of the tax laws. Adoption of such a standard will
allow assessment, collection or payment from the assets that gave rise to
the liability in light of the constraints placed by the actual existence,
under state law, of the LLC as separate entity. The Service can then im-
218. If a disregarded entity's separate legal existence were to be disregarded for all
purposes under the Code, the proposed regulations would have provided that the single
owner of the disregarded entity was the proper party to consent to extensions of time or
against whom assessment and collection would proceed, regardless of whether the liability
arose from a time when the entity was not disregarded.
219. The regulations were proposed on April 1, 2004 and finalized less than a year later,
on February 25, 2005. T.D. 9183, 2004-32 I.R.B. 160.
220. On October 18, 2005, the Treasury issued proposed regulations that would treat
disregarded entities as separate entities for employment tax and related reporting require-
ment purposes. Prop. Rul., 70 Fed. Reg. 60,475 (Oct. 18, 2005). These proposed regula-
tions have not been warmly received by taxpayers, whose representatives have commented
that they will impose significant administrative hardships. See, e.g., Kenneth Klein, Attor-
ney Raises Concerns With Proposed Regs on Employment Taxation of Disregarded Entities,
TAX NoTEs TODAY, Jan. 13, 2006, LEXIS, 2006 TNT 16-20; Ray McCarty, Institute Criti-
cizes Proposed Regs on Employment Taxation of Disregarded Entities, TAX NoTEs TODAY,
Dec. 30, 2005, LEXIS, 2006 TNT 28-23; Deborah Walker, Deloitte Tax Comments on Pro-
posed Regs on Employment, Excise Taxation of Disregarded Entities, TAX NoTEs TODAY,
Jan. 19, 2006, LEXIS, 2006 TNT 16-21.
221. The Treasury might well have a change of heart more broadly, as the Service con-
tinues to have to cope with situations that were almost certainly unforeseen when the
Check-the-Box regulations were issued. For example, the collections problems involving
LLCs are not limited to disregarded entities. In Rev. Rul. 2004-41, the Service examined
the question of whether it could collect employment tax liabilities from the members of an
LLC that was treated as a partnership. Rev. Rul. 2004-41, 2004-18 I.R.B. 846. Although
the Service acknowledged that it could collect against partners in a partnership, it noted
that such a result followed because partners in a partnership were jointly and severally
liable for the debts of the partnership. Id. In the case of an LLC treated for federal in-
come tax purposes as a partnership, however, state law contains no such provision; on the
contrary, state law provides that the members of the LLC are not liable for the debts of the
LLC. Id. Therefore, the Service concluded that in the absence of fraud, it would not be
able to proceed against the members of the LLC or their assets to satisfy unpaid employ-
ment tax liabilities of the LLC even if the members of the LLC had sufficient assets to
satisfy the liability. Id.
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plement the standard by the issuance of specific rules as it deems
appropriate.
VI. A PLACE FOR CRYSTALS AND A PLACE FOR MUD
Adoption of the model I have suggested would provide certainty to
taxpayers ex ante, flexibility to the Service ex post, and bring transparency
to the guidance process. It would free the Service to reach results such as
those it reached in Revenue Ruling 2004-88,222 while preventing the con-
fusion that arises when the regulations seem to say one thing, but the
Service seems to do another. Revenue Ruling 2004-88 illustrates the
point. In that Ruling, the Service held that a partnership that had a single
member LLC as a partner had a pass-through entity partner, and there-
fore could not be treated as a small partnership for purposes of the Tax
Equity Fiscal Responsibility Act ("TEFRA") partnership audit provi-
sions. It also held that the single owner of the LLC could not serve as the
tax matters partner.2 23 Neither of these conclusions follow from the ap-
plication of the Check-the-Box regulations, but both involve the ex post
audit process. The Service seems to have reached these conclusions in
the interest of administrability of the TEFRA provisions, but in the pro-
cess, it reached conclusions that conflict with the Check-the-Box regula-
tions because it failed to disregard the separate existence of the single
member LLCs.
If the separate identity of the single member LLC partner that was the
subject of Revenue Ruling 2004-88 were disregarded, its owner would be
the partner for tax purposes. Only if that owner were a pass-through
entity should the partnership be ineligible for treatment as a small part-
nership under the TEFRA audit procedures. 2 24 This result is inconsistent
with the reason for the rule; only if the single owner of the LLC is itself a
pass-through entity would the actual number of taxpayers whose returns
are affected by partnership items differ from the nominal number of part-
ners, thus permitting an end-run around the ten partner limitation of
§ 6231(a)(1)(B)(i). It also satisfies the requirement of § 6231(g), that the
Service should be able to determine the application of the TEFRA provi-
sions from the face of the partnership return because since the single
member is the partner for tax purposes, the single member should be
listed as the partner on the return. 225 Such a construction would also
222. Rev. Rul. 2004-88, 2004-32 I.R.B. 165.
223. Id. The TEFRA partnership provisions are codified in I.R.C. §§ 6221-6234 (2005).
224. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6231(a)(1)-(2) provides that a partnership that has a pass-
through partner, as defined in § 6231(a)(9), cannot be treated as a small partnership.
Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6231(a)(1)-(2) (2001). Section 6231(a)(9) defines a pass-through part-
ner as "a partnership, estate, trust, S corporation, nominee, or other similar person through
whom other persons hold an interest in the partnership with respect to which proceedings
under this subchapter are conducted." Id. § 301.6231(a)(9).
225. In Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 2002-50-012, the Service listed § 6231(g) in support of
its conclusion that a single-member LLC should be treated as a pass-thru partner, appar-
ently assuming that the LLC, and not its single owner would be listed as the partner on the
return. It did not explain why that should be the case. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. Mem.
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comport with the statutory definition of a pass-through partner, which is
a "partnership, estate, trust, S corporation, nominee, or similar person"
(emphasis added). 226 If the LLC is disregarded as an entity separate
from its owner, as provided by the Check-the-Box regulations, it is not
only not similar to a partnership, estate, trust, S corporation or nominee,
but it is not a person at all for tax purposes. 227 Treating the LLC as a
pass-through partner is patently inconsistent with the Check-the-Box reg-
ulations and calls into question the manner in which the Service will ap-
ply those regulations.228 Inconsistency creates uncertainty and will
ultimately return the law to its pre-Check-the-Box chaotic state. Paradise
will have been lost.
Paradise, however need not be lost. If the Service finds it useful in the
audit process to restrict exemption from the TEFRA partnership audit
rules to situations where the legal partner is also the person in whose
return the partnership items are taken into account, the Service should be
able to regard the existence of the LLC for that purpose. 229 It will be
able to do so without confusing the law on the Check-the-Box regulations
if it has announced, as I suggest, that for purposes of assessment, collec-
tion, and payment it will respect the separate identity of the LLC insofar
as necessary to permit proper administration of the tax laws. Announc-
ing such a standard will allow the Service to reach conclusions such as the
2002-50-012 (Aug. 30, 2002), reprinted in Disregarded Entity Rules Applied to TEFRA
Small Partnership Exception, TAX NoTEs TODAY, Dec. 16,2002, LEXIS, 2002 TNT 241-52.
The instructions to Form 1065 provide that if a single-member LLC owns an interest in the
partnership, and the LLC is treated as a disregarded entity, then the name and address of
the owner of the disregarded entity should be listed on the Schedule K-1 where it asks for
the partner's name, address, and other identifying information. I.R.S. INSTRUcrIONS TO
FORM 106522, (bottom of the middle column), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdfl
i1065.pdf. The Service should therefore have no trouble identifying the true partner for tax
purposes.
226. Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 2002-50-012.
227. A disregarded entity also differs from a grantor trust because although income and
deductions of a grantor trust are taxed as if earned or incurred by the grantor, the Service
does not take the position that the existence of the trust should be disregarded for tax
purposes. A grantor trust exists, but it is a pass-through entity. By contrast, under the
Check-the-Box regulations, a disregarded entity does not exist for tax purposes. The
Check-the-Box regulations do not say that a single-member LLC will be treated as a pass-
through. Instead, they specifically say that it will be treated as a branch or proprietorship.
228. The Service seems to have acknowledged that it was reaching a result inconsistent
with disregarding the separate identity of the LLC when it noted in Chief Couns. Adv.
Mem. 2002-50-012 that "the disregarded entity regulations did not even exist when Con-
gress enacted sections 6231(a)(1)(B) and 6231(a)(9)." Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 2002-50-
012. My claim is not that the Service was wrong in reaching the conclusion it did in the
Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. and in Rev. Rul. 2004-88. Rather, my claim is that the Service
ought to be able to reach a result that it feels is administratively sensible without trying to
fit that result within the parameters of the Check-the-Box regulations.
229. That is precisely what the Service did in Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 2002-50-012.
The Service gave administrability as the reason it was concluding that the single-member
LLC would be a pass-thru partner. Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 2002-50-012. My point is not
that the Service was wrong to want to regard the disregarded entity for purposes of ad-
ministering the TEFRA audit provisions. My point is that the Service should be able to
state that for return filing and other audit purposes, it will not ignore the separate existence
of the LLC and not have to justify its decision in ways that are inconsistent with the posi-
tion taken in the Check-the-Box regulations.
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one it reached in Revenue Ruling 2004-88 without contorting the applica-
tion of the Check-the-Box regulations.
Adoption of the bifurcated analysis that I propose is supported by the
scholarship that addresses the operation of rules and standards. First,
that scholarship shows that the development of the Check-the-Box regu-
lation followed a well worn pattern of evolution from crystals to mud and
back again. Carol Rose's work explores this pattern by showing that sev-
eral important areas of property law have cycled between crystalline rules
and muddy standards. 230 She posits that as an area of the law becomes
more important to more people, its very ubiquity demands clear rules
with high predictive capability. The crystalline rules clear away the mud,
but the mud returns as decision makers blunt the hard edges of the rule
to effect justice in particular cases. Eventually the crystal again becomes
mud, and the cycle starts all over again.
That pattern is starkly evident in the development of the tax law that
attempted to define what types of entities should be treated as corpora-
tions for tax purposes. As Part I of this article has shown, the law on
entity classification has cycled between muddy standards and crystalline
rules from the inception of the income tax. Indeed, it was the muddied
state of the law that led Treasury to propose incrementally crystalline
rules designed to allow both the Service and taxpayers to determine the
tax characterization of an unincorporated entity. The Treasury's efforts
did not stem the devolution into mud until 1996, when in frustration over
its inability to function in the mud created by the application of the Kint-
ner regulations, the Treasury promulgated the seemingly crystalline
Check-the-Box regulations. Now, the Service's fledgling attempts to ap-
ply the rule created by those regulations threaten to muddy the field
again. Guidance that sometimes regards, and other times disregards, the
separate existence of an entity without setting forth a theoretical frame-
work to explain the difference can only serve to muddy the crystalline
edges of the Check-the-Box regulations. Mud is soft. Sinking into it, like
taking a bite of the serpent's apple, can seem like the only thing to do.
This article is an attempt to stop the cycling between crystals and mud by
showing that given the promulgation of the Check-the-Box regulations,
when it comes to entity classification ex ante crystals are better than mud,
no matter how seductive the latter.
A crystalline rule is especially apt for entity classification ex ante not
only for all of the reasons that make rules especially efficient ex ante,231
but also because the adoption of a crystalline rule here does not mean
that substance has to be forsaken forever. As discussed in Part III(B),
above, the Check-the-Box regulations only provide a first-cut answer to
the question "For federal tax purposes, what kind of entity are you?"
230. See Rose, supra note 12.
231. Rules offer certainty and predictability at a time when taxpayers are most likely to
seek legal advice before acting and, in this case, before deciding whether to make an elec-
tion. Kaplow, supra note 12, at 568-81.
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That first cut answer is very important and in many cases will be the only
answer necessary, but it need not be determinative of the way in which an
entity's transactions will be treated any more than concluding that an en-
tity is unquestionably a corporation determines that all actions that it un-
dertakes are given effect for federal income tax purposes. That Monitor
was a corporation did not mean that Mrs. Gregory's desired tax result
came to pass.232 Furthermore, in matters of assessment, collection, and
payment, where the efficiency and administrability gains of rules do not
obtain, a standard can be announced to preserve the government's ability
to collect the amount of revenue properly due from each taxpayer whose
property gives rise to that liability.
The soundness of the bifurcated approach I suggest maximizes the ben-
efits of using rules as well as standards. As Kaplow has pointed out, rules
are most effective when the subject matter has wide applicability and in-
volves matters in which legal advice is likely to be sought before action is
taken-ex ante creation of the law. 233 By contrast, standards are best
suited for ex post application of the law, where action has taken place,
typically without the benefit of prior legal advice, and the task for the law
is to determine the legal consequences of that action.234 Kaplow's analy-
sis suggests that while the Treasury may have been wise to have adopted a
rule disregarding the separate existence of single member LLCs in the
Check-the-Box regulations, it would not be wise to apply that rule both
ex ante and ex post. The difficulties the Service is having in applying the
rule in the audit and collection process show that Kaplow was right to
have distinguished ex ante from ex post applications, and that it is sound
for the Service to do likewise.
This bifurcated approach to the adoption of rules and standards is fur-
ther supported by Duncan Kennedy's observation that "individualism
seems to harmonize with an insistence on rigid rules rigidly applied. '235
In promulgating the Check-the-Box regulations and allowing owners of
unincorporated entities to elect the tax treatment of those entities, the
Treasury maximized individual choice; rigidly applying the rule of Check-
the-Box regulations preserves that choice. The Service and the Treasury
adopted a rule to provide certainty and administrability, and only consis-
tent application of the rule in situations where the determination is im-
portant ex ante will allow the Treasury and the Service to achieve the
administrability gains of letting taxpayers decide. However, the reasons
for adopting a rule ex ante do not apply to determinations in matters of
assessment, collection, and payment, ex post. Individualism is not the
concern there-sound administration of the tax laws is. A different ap-
proach to problems of assessment, collection, and payment, which is re-
232. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
233. Kaplow, supra note 12 at 597-98.
234. Id.
235. Kennedy, supra note 12, at 1685.
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sponsive to the constraints placed on the Service by state law concepts of
ownership, is therefore appropriate.
V. CONCLUSION
The creation of disregarded entities nearly a decade ago marked the
end of administrative attempts to determine entity classification as a mat-
ter of substance. By providing for elective classification in the Check-the-
Box regulations, the Treasury and the Service promised to usher in an era
of simplicity and predictability. Experience has shown how easy it is to
blur the seemingly clear lines drawn in those regulations. The Treasury
and the Service are returning the law to its pre-Check-the-Box confused
state because they lack a principled way of distinguishing between situa-
tions where the clear rule of those regulations should apply and situations
where a more nuanced determination is desirable. This article has not
only canvassed and evaluated the administrative experience with the do-
mestic implementation of the Check-the-Box regulations, but it has also
suggested an analytical approach designed to retain the crystalline ap-
proach where it will serve the goals of certainty and predictability, while
allowing for a more nuanced approach where necessary to permit the
sound administration of the tax laws.
The Treasury and the Service might take their cue from the Tony award
winning play and Oscar-winning motion picture Chicago, which illustrates
the pitfalls of oscillating between regarding and disregarding without a
principled analysis to determine when to do what. In Chicago, Amos, the
husband of the female lead, Roxie Hart, is so often ignored that he sings
what could well be the anthem of disregarded entities. Amos proclaims:
Cellophane,
Mr. Cellophane,
should have been my name,
Mr. Cellophane,
4cause you can look right through me,
walk right by me, and never know I'm there.
The inconsistency with which Roxie treats Amos threatens to undo her.
Roxie ignores Amos and has an affair, but relies on him to be there and
take the blame for the murder she commits. He asserts himself when he
discovers she's cheated on him, and that gets her arrested. She then ig-
nores him while she is in jail, but is forced to confront his existence when
she alleges pregnancy. Although she wants to ignore his existence, the
legal system recognizes him as her husband, so ignoring him is actually
impossible. At her trial, she sees the wisdom of regarding him as her
husband and thereby delights the jury, which acquits her. While the anal-
ogy is not perfect and the legal system depicted in the show is certainly
not a desideratum, Roxie's relationship to Mr. Cellophane nevertheless
serves as a cautionary tale. When the existence of a disregarded entity is
acknowledged by substantive law, even those who would prefer to disre-
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gard may have little practical choice but to concur, particularly if they
need to get the property that the disregarded entity has. If an entity must
be regarded some of the time, principle should guide what those times
are. This article has attempted to suggest such a principle.
